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Abstract 
This study addresses a lacuna in scholarship on the ideology of the Islamic State 
resulting from the greater focus on al-Qaeda in scholarship on Salafist jihadism. 
Through a qualitative analysis of the entire runs of the Islamic State’s magazines Dabiq 
and Rumiyah, this study offers full and granular image of the group’s ideology. 
Following this, the categorical differences between the ideologies of al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State are identified and the meaning of these differences is discussed as well as 
the potential problems they pose for future scholarship – including an elaboration on the 
ideology of the Islamic State as representative of an emergent shift in Salafist jihadi 
ideology regarding Muslim unity.
1 
Chapter 1: Topic, Research Questions, Methodology, and 
Overview 
Since its apparent eruption onto the world stage in June of 2014, the Islamic 
State has shocked and disrupted the Middle East, and the world at large, with its 
violent theatrics and intense sectarianism. Though it came to wide attention in 
June of 2014, following its capture of Mosul, declaration of a renewed 
Caliphate, and rebranding itself as the Islamic State (formerly The Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria), the group has its origins at least as far back as 2003 in the 
immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces led by the 
United States. Though ostensibly past the zenith of its power in terms of 
territory, the Islamic State’s influence on the region, Salafi jihadism, and the 
world at large, has been profound. The Islamic State has conducted or inspired 
over one-hundred and forty successful attacks in twenty-nine countries as of 
February 2018.1 Even if and/or when the Islamic State is fully stripped of all its 
territorial holdings, the true extent of the group’s impact is unlikely to become 
fully clear for years. 
The Islamic State: Brief Historical Background 
While the Islamic State as it has become most widely known came into being in 
June of 2014, its origin extends back through predecessor groups into the late 
1990s. Below is a brief overview of the group’s history from its origins onward. 
In 1999, Jordanian national and Salafi jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
founded his own organization, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, with the intention 
                                                 
1 Tim Lister, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller and Mohammed 
Tawfeeq, “ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043,” CNN, 2-12-2018. 
2 
of fighting and overthrowing the government of Jordan.2 Zarqawi and his 
organization were strong proponents of the pronouncement of takfir – declaring 
other Muslims to be apostates and targeting them for death.3 Following al-
Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan, 
and the invasion of Iraq by US-led Coalition forces, Zarqawi and his 
organization entered Iraq to participate in the insurgency against US occupying 
forces and their Iraqi allies.4  
The activities of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were characterized by 
suicide bombings, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and an 
intense sectarian focus of its attacks on Iraqi Shias.5 The group’s violence also 
included a flare for theatrics – Zarqawi and his fighters became notorious for 
filming the beheadings of captured enemies and distributing the videos on the 
internet.6  
In October of 2004, Zarqawi pledged the allegiance of himself and his 
organization to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization as an affiliate, 
changing its name to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, more 
generally known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), though Zarqawi himself never 
called his group by this name.7 The relationship between Zarqawi and al-
                                                 
2 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Reagan Arts, 
2015), 12–13. 
3 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State, First Picador ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, [2016] 2015), 10–11. 
4 Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, First Anchor Books ed. (New York: Penguin 
Random House, [2016] 2015), 98. 
5 Ibid., 113–114. 
6 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2016), 2. 
7 Ibid., 21–22. 
3 
Qaeda’s central leadership was a strained one, especially over Zarqawi’s 
continual focus on sectarian violence and takfirism.8 
 AQI’s intense violence against Iraqi Shias and its violence against Sunni 
Muslims it considered apostates – including a series of roughly one-hundred 
attacks against voters participating in the democratic apostasy of the legislative 
elections of Iraq in January of 2005 – increasingly alienated AQI from more 
nationalist Sunni Iraqis.9 In an attempt to counteract this unpopularity and 
network with more like-minded jihadis and insurgents, Zarqawi formed the 
Mujahideen Shura Council in January of 2006.10 That June, Zarqawi was killed 
in a US airstrike, and leadership of AQI passed to Abu Ayyub al-Masri.11 
 In October of 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the 
creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) out of AQI, elected Abu Omar al-
Baghdadi as its leader, and later dissolved itself into the new organization.12 
AQI was folded into ISI, and its leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri was named War 
Minister.13 Through this period, despite the name change, ISI remained an al-
Qaeda affiliate and continued to be generally referred to as AQI internationally. 
 From 2007 through 2010 ISI experienced cycles of setbacks and 
resurgence in its fight against American and Iraqi forces. In April of 2010, both 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri were killed in a raid, and most 
                                                 
8 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 72–74. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 41–44. 
11 Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 62. 
12 Gerges, ISIS: A History, 93. 
13 Ibid., 94. 
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of the group’s leadership had been killed or captured by this time.14 That May, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named the new leader of ISI.15 
 The arrival of Baghdadi as leader saw another resurgence of the group. 
As Iraqi Sunnis continued to chafe under the sectarian politics of the majority 
Shia government, Baghdadi was able to bring experienced Sunni fighters and 
former Baathist regime officials to fill out its leadership structure – while 
growing Sunni disaffection with the new Iraqi government helped to replenish 
ISI’s overall numbers.16 The resurgent ISI was able to exacerbate sectarian 
conflict within Iraq through renewed sectarian violence into 2012, while the 
outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in August of 2011 saw the group begin to 
make inroads into Syria through 2013.17 
 With this expansion into Syria, the group again renamed itself, now as 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in April of 2013. The group brought 
its propensity for intense sectarian violence into its conflict with Bashar al-
Assad’s Alawite-controlled government.18 As ISIS became increasing violent 
and continued to proliferate in Iraq and Syria into late 2013, the tension between 
itself and al-Qaeda’s central leadership – always fraught with tension – reached 
a breaking point.19 In October of 2013, al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 
(who replaced bin Laden following his death in 2012) ordered ISIS to dissolve 
                                                 
14 McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, 45. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Warrick, Black Flags, 259. 
17 Ibid., 260. 
18 Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an 
Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 119–120. 
19 Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 68. 
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itself and for Baghdadi to focus his efforts in Iraq.20 Baghdadi refused and 
remained active in Syria, culminating in al-Qaeda publicly disavowing ISIS in 
February of 2014.21 
 Such disavowal hardly mattered to Baghdadi, whose forces had captured 
Fallujah the previous month.22 By mid-June of 2014, ISIS had captured Mosul 
as well.23 Flush with new power and territory, and now independent of al-Qaeda, 
ISIS once again changed its name. On June 29, 2014, Baghdadi declared himself 
the Caliph of a revived global Caliphate and renamed ISIS, simply, the Islamic 
State (IS), demanding the allegiance of Sunni Muslims worldwide.24 
 What followed was a whirlwind of expansion and violence for which the 
world found itself unprepared. The Islamic State rapidly expanded its territorial 
gains into 2014, expanding over vast portions of Iraq and Syria and shocking the 
world with its revival of the institution of slavery against the captured Yazidi 
population in northern Iraq, and its theatrical display of intense violence 
combined with media and technical acumen.25 This included a surge of Islamic 
State orchestrated and inspired terror attacks globally, achieving more violence 
against the West in a matter of years than al-Qaeda had managed over decades. 
While these features of the Islamic State generated the most attention 
internationally, the group also expended unprecedented effort and resources in 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 69. 
22 Gerges, ISIS: A History, 169. 
23 Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising (New York: OR 
Books, 2014), 50. 
24 Lister, The Syrian Jihad, 221. 
25 McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, 111–113; for discussion of how this media acumen translated 
into the digital sphere, see also Elizabeth Bodin-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Madeline Magnuson, 
Zev Winkelman, Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter (Santa Monica, 
CA: The Rand Corporation, 2016). 
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establishing a jihadist state. Thousands of administrative documents discovered 
following the recapture of Mosul demonstrate the full extent to which the 
Islamic State sought to functionally actualize its namesake: expansive public 
works and sanitation, health services and administrative apparatuses, an 
economy with a robust system of taxation, an education system extending 
through graduate studies, a court system, and others.26 Erstwhile citizens 
liberated from Islamic State control often characterized its state services as 
significantly more advanced than those present before Islamic State control.27  
 Ultimately, the Islamic State was divested of its heartland in Iraq and 
Syria, with nearly all of its territory there retaken by the end of 2017. Despite 
this, in the interim, the Islamic State has spawned affiliated organizations across 
three continents.28 While the Islamic State, as it was most visible in Iraq and 
Syria, may be ultimately destroyed, the scope of its impact may well take years 
to fully understand. 
Approaching the Research Questions 
The apparently spectacular deviation of the Islamic State’s praxis from that of 
the al-Qaeda to which it, and its previous incarnations, had previously sworn 
allegiance, was shocking in many quarters - from academic and policy circles to 
the international media and public at large. The core of this shock is the 
lingering sense that al-Qaeda represents the “cutting edge” and benchmark of 
Salafi jihadism worldwide. This sense developed in the wake of al-Qaeda’s 
                                                 
26 Rukmini Callimachi, “The ISIS Files,” New York Times, 3-4-2018.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Office of the Spokesperson, “State Department Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and 
Senior Leaders,” U.S. Department of State, 2-27-2018. 
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spectacular attacks on the United States in September of 2001.29 This sense 
corresponded with al-Qaeda’s own self-image (and may indeed be the only item 
upon which al-Qaeda and the United States agreed) and extended to the point 
that elements within academic and policy circles conceived of al-Qaeda’s 
ideology as a sort of free-floating Salafist jihadi meme proliferating into a global 
“leaderless jihad.”30 While this particular memetic conception has been 
controversial among academics, it has persisted.31 
 Outside of the “leaderless jihad” concept, al-Qaeda still retains the status 
of Salafi jihadism benchmark as the overall leader of the “global jihad” against 
the West in the perception of academic and policy circles. This has been more of 
a reflection of the sense of al-Qaeda as the Salafist jihadi “cutting edge,” and has 
persisted even as the group has waxed and waned in relative marginality as an 
actor.32 Indeed, aside from the prestige that went along with the 9/11 attacks, the 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of this development, see Barak Mendelsohn, Combating Jihadism: American 
Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), especially 53–59. 
30 Ibid., 57-58. For the concept of “leaderless jihad,” see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: 
Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008). Notably, Sageman considers this memetic function as active even in the absence of action 
or even the continued existence of al-Qaeda.  
31 For example, see the exchange between Sageman and Bruce Hoffman over the matter, which 
was intense enough that it generated national attention: Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, “A Not 
Very Private Feud Over Terrorism,” New York Times, 6-8-2008; For examples of persistence, 
see Antoine Bousquet, “Complexity Theory and the War on Terror: Understanding the Self-
Organising Dynamics of Leaderless Jihad,” Journal of International Relations and Development 
15 no. 3 (2011): 1–25; also Jason Burkeman, The New Threat: the Past, Present, and Future of 
Islamic Militancy (New York: The New Press, 2017). 
32 See Barak Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and its 
Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), especially 61–65. Here, Mendelsohn 
expresses this dichotomy well, characterizing al-Qaeda as too incompetent to use the prestige of 
9/11 to pull itself out of marginality, arguing that the adoption of the franchising strategy was an 
attempt to counter its increasingly marginal status post-9/11, and that this strategy has backfired 
by only accelerating its marginalization. 
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group became increasingly marginal as an actor subsequently.33 In this sense, 
the benchmarking has been more of a reflection of al-Qaeda as an idea of what 
is normative for Salafi jihadism.34 This has persisted long past the operational 
capacity which made al-Qaeda this benchmark in the first place.35 The 
spectacular advent and behaviors of the Islamic State have presented a challenge 
to the scholarly understanding of Salafi jihadism, one to which it has had 
difficulty responding. 
 This difficulty has much to do with the time the Islamic State’s 
forerunner organizations spent as al-Qaeda affiliates/franchises. While it was 
understood by scholars during this period that there was a certain level of 
tension between the senior leadership of al-Qaeda and Zarqawi’s organization in 
Iraq, the general sense was that at its core was a debate over praxis in the jihad 
arena of Iraq, rather than one of real differences of objective or ideology. This is 
especially notable in one particular aspect: the original alliance between al-
Qaeda and Zarqawi was based around a sort of timetable and praxis 
compromise, which Brian H. Fishman has discussed in his 2016 monograph The 
Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory.  
This “master plan” was a part of the agreement wherein Zarqawi and his 
fellows swore allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004.36 It consists of a seven-stage 
timetable including the reestablishment of the Caliphate between 2013 and 
                                                 
33 Vahid Brown, “Classical and Global Jihad: Al-Qai’da’s Franchising Frustrations,” in Fault 
Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, Assaf Moghdam and 
Brian Fishman (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2011), 88. 
34 Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise, 61. 
35 Phillipe Migaux, “Al Qaeda,” in The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to ISIS, Gérard 
Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.) (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 328–331. 
36 Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 17. 
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2016, with a “final victory” for the jihadis projected around 2020.37 Scholarly 
treatment of this “master plan” illustrates the persistence of the concept of al-
Qaeda as a benchmark for what is normative in Salafi jihadism. Prior to the split 
between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, this “master plan” was utilized as an 
exemplar of al-Qaeda’s status as the benchmark and leader of Salafi jihadism.38 
This persisted until the Islamic State broke away from al-Qaeda.39 After this 
break, however, there has been a move to retain the sense of al-Qaeda 
normativity vis-à-vis Salafi jihadism, leading to a disavowal that the “master 
plan” was ever actually a part of that benchmark – even from scholars who had 
previously utilized it as an example of such.40 
This reflects a certain lack of plasticity in regard to scholarly 
understanding of Salafi jihadism in response to the Islamic State. While the 
unavoidable concession has been made to the clear differences in praxis between 
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the benchmark of al-Qaeda as normative for 
Salafi jihadism has persisted. Brian H. Fishman has noted that this has caused 
scholars to be slow in investigating, or even acknowledging, major ideological 
differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State outside of the sectarianism 
which drives its spectacular violence.41 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 For a discussion of the “master plan” as it pertained to al-Qaeda’s engagement with the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, see Barak Mendelsohn, “Al-Qaeda’s Palestinian Problem,” Survival 51 no. 4 
(2009): 71–86.  
39 For an example from months before this break, see Martin Rudner, “Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year 
Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36 no. 12 
(2013): 953–980. 
40 For an example of this, see Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise, 94–97. 
41 Brian H. Fishman, "The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final 
Victory” (Lecture, Sponsored by The Center for Right-Wing Studies, University of California, 
Berkeley, CA, February 2, 2017).   
10 
It is to this lacuna, the overall ideology of the Islamic State, that the 
present study directs its research questions: 
1. What is the ideology of the Islamic State? 
2. How does Islamic State ideology differ from current scholarly 
understanding of Salafi jihadism? 
3. What is the meaning of these differences? 
Researchers on the topic of the Islamic State’s ideology who are seeking to 
answer questions such as those above at least have the benefit of not lacking for 
available documentary materials. The Islamic State is a prolific publisher of 
online content, from magazines and documentary films, to the polished and 
theatrical execution videos which have garnered such attention in Western 
media coverage and scholarship. Rather than focus on the production value or 
savvy of the group’s internet magazines, this study will utilize them as a source 
of information. 
Methodology: Qualitative Analysis of Texts 
In pursuit of answers to this study’s research questions on the ideology of the 
Islamic State, the text of the group’s al-Hayat Media Center English-language 
magazines Dabiq, published from 2014–2016, and Rumiyah, published from 
2016–2017, will be subject to computer-aided qualitative analysis (QA) of its 
content. The rationale for this methodology, outlined below, builds upon extant 
but limited qualitative analysis work on the Islamic State. 
Rationale for Methodology 
Since the increase of Salafi jihadist utilization of the internet, qualitative 
analysis studies on these groups’ published content, especially al-Qaeda, have 
11 
enriched the knowledge base of both academic scholars and policy makers. 
Through the course of the War on Terror since 2001, such analysis has heavily 
focused its attention on al-Qaeda. Such studies have allowed for much greater 
granularity in the understanding of Salafi jihadist strategies, objectives, and 
ideology – with al-Qaeda serving as a benchmark.42 
 The advent of the Islamic State, given its relative youth in comparison to 
its “parent” organization, al-Qaeda, has generated a limited amount of 
qualitative analysis on its published content. Such analyses have focused on the 
strategies and objectives of the Islamic State, seeking to parse the relevant 
differences between the newer group and al-Qaeda along these dimensions.43 
While such analyses have been useful in expanding understanding of strategic 
and objective differences beyond the obvious, such as the wide use of theatrical 
executions and sectarian violence, qualitative analysis work on Islamic State 
ideology has thus far been lacking. 
 Overall, it is assumed that the ideology of the Islamic State, given its 
status as a Salafi jihadist group, is essentially the same as the ideology of al-
Qaeda. There is a certain illogic to this, as the drastic differences in objectives 
                                                 
42 See, for example: Gregory L. Keeney and Detlof von Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring 
the Objectives of Terrorists,” Risk Analysis 30 no. 12 (2010): 1803–1816; Valentina Bartolucci 
and Steven R. Corman, The Narrative Landscape of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Tempe, 
AZ: The Center for Strategic Communication, 2014); Manuel R. Torres, “Analysis and 
Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18 
no. 3 (2006): 399–421; Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, “Examining the Role of Religion 
in Radicalization to Violent Islamist Extremism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35 no. 12 
(2012): 849–862. 
43 See, for example: Celine Marie I. Novenario, “Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
Through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39 no. 
11 (2016): 953–967; Also, see Fishman, The Master Plan; While engaging in QA on Salafi 
jihadist web content to build course syllabi at West Point, Fishman stumbled upon the material 
serving as the basis of The Master Plan. See the lecture in which he discusses this process: 
Fishman, "The Master Plan,” Lecture. 
12 
and strategies between the groups at least implies a difference in the ideology 
informing the Islamic State’s objectives and strategies. Yet, scholarly 
understanding of the Islamic State’s ideology remains rooted in the corpus on 
Salafi jihadism developed primarily through analyses of al-Qaeda, by way of the 
group’s persistent status as a benchmark as discussed above. That the groups 
have gone to war against one another, with each decrying the other as 
fundamentally in error, and even existentially illegitimate, highlights a need to 
approach the ideology of the Islamic State as a discrete subject of analysis. This 
study seeks to address this lack. 
 A systematic qualitative analysis of the Islamic State’s Dabiq and 
Rumiyah magazines, in addition to providing answers to the above research 
questions, holds three distinctive additional merits: 
1. Offers a more complete picture of the differences between the Islamic 
State and al-Qaeda beyond strategies and objectives. 
2. QA on the roughly 700,000 words of both magazines allows for a robust 
and truly granular understanding of the Islamic State’s ideology. 
3. Provides an image of developing trends in, and the cutting edge of, Salafi 
jihadist ideology as represented by the Islamic State as a break from the 
al-Qaeda benchmark. 
The third listed benefit is the most important from a utilitarian standpoint: the 
scholarly corpus of Salafi jihadist ideology needs to be current in order to 
remain relevant.  
 Further, from a policy standpoint, a clear and accurate understanding of 
the Islamic State is ultimately vital to the success of any effort to combat the 
Islamic State. As Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz rightly 
observes, the first and most vital judgment of those making war is to “[…] 
13 
establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it 
for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”44 This all-
important judgment is impossible for as long as the scope of the Islamic State’s 
ideology remains a mystery – which it will so long as it is merely assumed to 
reflect that of al-Qaeda.  
 The qualitative analysis of the Islamic State’s English-language 
magazines for this study is carried out in four separate stages, as summarized 
below: 
Summary of Stage 1 – Coding Text 
First, the entire runs of Dabiq and Rumiyah will be coded for content utilizing 
the AQUAD 7 software, illustrated below:   
                                                 
44 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds., trans.) (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, [1989] 1832), 88. 
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AQUAD 7 is an open-source, freeware, qualitative analysis package created by 
Günter L. Huber, retired Chair of Educational Psychology at the Department of 
Educational Psychology, University of Tübingen. The AQUAD 7 software, 
along with its documentation, can be found at: http://www.aquad.de/ 
 The raw text of Dabiq (16 issues) and Rumiyah (13 issues) are parsed 
from each issue and converted to rich text format (.rtf) files, with file names in 
ascending order (t_dabiq01, t_dabiq02…etc.). These files are then imported into 
the AQUAD 7 software, as illustrated below: 
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Within the AQUAD 7 software environment, the text of each issue of Dabiq and 
Rumiyah is read and coded. In Qualitative Analysis, segments of text are 
selected and assigned codes. Each code represents a particular category. For the 
purpose of the present study, each category reflects a topic of ideological 
context. For example: segments of text pertaining to topics such as 
“International Order” or “Arab-Israeli Conflict” will be assigned the appropriate 
code/category. This process is illustrated below: 
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For the complete list of ideological context codes/categories and the process of 
their determination, see Chapter 2. The completion of this process makes up the 
first stage of this study’s qualitative analysis. 
Summary of Stage 2 – Analyzing Coded Text 
In the second stage of qualitative analysis, the AQUAD 7 software is used to 
aggregate the coded text segments by type and then output them as individual 
text files, again by code/category, for analysis. These aggregated collections are 
carefully analyzed to derive an expansive set of ideological elements of the 
Islamic State. For example, an ideological element derived from a text segment 
from the code/category “International Order” would be something like “Jihad is 
the only acceptable Islamic response to the international order.”  
The complete list of these elements, organized by code/category, can be 
found in Appendix A. From these ideological elements, a complete framework 
of the Islamic State’s ideology will be constructed in the next stage.  
Summary of Stage 3 – Deriving Islamic State Ideology 
The ideological elements of the previous stage of qualitative analysis are 
condensed in order to derive the framework of the Islamic State’s overall 
ideology, organized by code/category. For example, the condensed ideological 
elements pertaining to the code/category “International Order” will derive an 
overview of the Islamic State’s ideology regarding the International Order. The 
results of this process will be applied in the next stage. 
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Summary of Stage 4 – Addressing Research Questions 
At length, the findings of the qualitative analysis will be brought to bear upon 
the research questions outlined earlier in the Introduction: 
1. What is the ideology of the Islamic State? 
2. How does Islamic State ideology differ from current scholarly 
understanding of Salafi jihadism? 
3. What is the meaning of these differences? 
The process of this qualitative analysis will be integrated into the structure of 
this study as outlined in the overview below.  
General Overview 
The qualitative analysis on the textual content of the Islamic State’s English-
language magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, and the derivation of the Islamic 
State’s ideology, is carried out in Chapter Two. This is accomplished by first 
surveying the scholarly corpus on the ideology of Salafi jihadism, for which al-
Qaeda serves as the benchmark, in order to generate the codes/categories which 
are then used for this study’s qualitative analysis. This will proceed as outlined 
above.  
Chapter Three comprises a discussion of the answers to this study’s 
research questions using the qualitative data derived within the previous chapter. 
This will take the form of an overview of the Islamic State’s ideology, organized 
by code/category, and a charting of the apparent differences in relation to 
scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi ideology. In addition to this, a Chi 
square test is run to determine what the qualitative data indicates about the 
relationship between the ideology of the Islamic State and what should be 
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expected of that ideology based on current scholarly understanding of Salafist 
jihadi ideology. The final research question is also addressed, discussing the 
meaning of these ideological differences. 
Finally, within the Conclusion, the scope of discussion is expanded to 
address the potential relevance of this study’s parsing of the Islamic State’s 
ideology more broadly upon scholarly understanding of Salafi jihadism more 
generally and considerations pertinent to future scholarship. 
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Chapter 2: Qualitative Analysis 
In order to execute a qualitative analysis of the text of Dabiq and Rumiyah 
magazines, a list of ideological codes/categories must first be generated with 
which the text will be coded. This process is laid out below, followed by a 
summary of the results of this study’s QA. 
Determining Codes/Categories 
What follows is a summary of the scholarly consensus of the ideology of Salafi 
jihadism, the scholarship of which uses al-Qaeda as a benchmark, as discussed 
above. From this consensus, a list of qualitative analysis codes/categories will be 
generated, which will be used in coding the text of the Islamic State’s Dabiq and 
Rumiyah magazines. 
Scholarly understanding of al-Qaeda/Salafist Jihadism 
The ideology of Salafi jihadism views the international order as illegitimate 
because it is un-Islamic. Broadly speaking, the post-Ottoman international order 
is seen as a Westernized imposition by “Crusaders and Zionists” that is 
fundamentally hostile toward Muslims. The global culture of this international 
order exists in a state of contemporary jahiliyyah (mirroring the religious 
ignorance of pre-Islamic Arabia), which must be Islamized overall. This is to be 
done on a state by state basis, individual nation-states are to be Islamized by 
inspiring populist Islamist revivals – the sum of these will form a sort of 
confederation of Islamic polities. At length, the whole of the Western 
international order is to be Islamized in this fashion. In the interim, terrorism 
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will continue until the West withdraws from Islamic lands and the State of Israel 
is destroyed.45 
Along those lines, the Arab-Israeli Conflict is ideologically prominent. 
The destruction of Israel is to include likewise the destruction, or the expulsion, 
of Israel’s Jewish population. This is a high priority, as Israel is viewed as one 
of the primary causes of continued Western presence within Islamic lands. The 
fight against Israel extends to support for other organizations, including those 
with differing ideologies, such as the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and even 
across the Sunni-Shia divide, to include Hezbollah. In line with this is a general 
support for the cause of Palestinian nationalism.46  
This willingness to support even Shia groups like Hezbollah in its fight 
against Israel illustrates the overall low-priority given to the Sunni-Shia divide. 
This follows from a sense that sectarian disputes can and should remain 
sidelined until such a time as the greater visions of ending Western involvement 
in Muslim lands and the destruction of Israel are realized. This has included a 
cool, yet not hostile, relationship with the government of Iran.47 
                                                 
45 See R. Gunaratna and A. Oreg, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (2010): 1043–1078; Manfred B. Steger, “Religion and 
Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism,” New Political Science 31 
no. 4 (2009): 529–541. 
46 See R. Rowland and K. Theye, “The Symbolic DNA of Terrorism,” Communication 
Monographs 75 (2008): 52-85; Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the 
Objectives of Terrorists”; Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”; Reuven Paz, 
“Jihadists and Nationalist Jihadists: Al-Qa’ida and Hamas,” in Fault Lines in Global Jihad: 
Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, Assaf Moghdam and Brian Fishman (eds.) 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 203–219. Notably, the Arab-Israeli Conflict has historically been 
one of, if not the only, matter upon which consensus cuts across all ideological demographics of 
the Muslim world; Mendelsohn, “Al-Qaeda’s Palestinian Problem.” 
47 See Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists”; Eban 
Kaplan, “The Al-Qaeda – Hezbollah Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 08-10-2006; 
“Iran's Link to Al-Qaeda: The 9-11 Commission's Evidence (Document),” Middle East 
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In terms of violence and combat, the ideological focus is on mass-
casualty terror attacks – with an emphasis on attacking Western, and especially 
US, targets. This “Far Enemy” emphasis follows from a logic that the West/US 
can be induced to divest itself from involvement in Muslim countries, and from 
support of Israel, if mass-casualty attacks are persistent and sustained. 
Achieving Western/US divestment will open the window for jihadis to 
successfully spearhead the popular uprising against the un-Islamic post-colonial 
states in Muslim lands. This includes support for and participation in local 
insurgencies against Western intervention (such as the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq). The gruesome execution of individual enemies and careless collateral 
damage to Muslim civilians are discouraged as counter-productive to winning 
the hearts and minds of the Muslim masses.48  
The ideology on governance holds that the only possible legitimate 
government is one based upon Islamic law (sharia). However, there is no fixed 
conception of what this should or could look like. Generally, this leans toward 
the support of Islamizing the structures of states already extant in Muslim lands 
– of inspiring through jihadi activities a populist movement wherein Muslims 
will self-Islamize the governance of their own states. In this regard, state-
building is an overall low priority. While the ideology supports the ultimate 
creation of a Caliphate, this is a long-term goal that – as mentioned above – is 
not possible until the “Far Enemy” is defeated and driven out of Muslim lands. 
                                                                                                                                   
Quarterly 11 no. 4 (2004): 71–74; Paul Hastert, “Al Qaeda and Iran: Friends or Foes, or 
Somewhere in Between?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30 no. 4 (2007): 327–336. 
48 See Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists”; 
Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age.”  
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At this point, the Islamization of extant states in Muslim lands is expected to 
flow organically from the Muslim masses themselves.49  
The generally paltry ideological coverage of state-building carries over 
to sparse coverage of economics. In terms of group funding, the focus is on 
donations to front the costs of its own operations and the funneling of funds to 
“jihad arenas” (areas of active jihadist insurgency). Beyond this, economic 
ideology centers on a form of economic warfare against the West/US. The idea 
is to “bleed” them economically through the massive expenditures required both 
to combat jihadi activity and to repair/recover from damage caused by mass-
casualty terror attacks. There is also a sense that the global economy can be 
gradually Islamized by the transfer of greater amounts of wealth into Muslim 
lands through Western/US continued dependency on petroleum.50  
Overall, the ideology is flexible enough that they are willing to 
collaborate with other jihadi groups, even when these groups are ideologically 
different – to the extent that outright conflict with other jihadi groups is sought 
to be avoided. This follows from a logic that the greater goal of ejecting the “Far 
Enemy” from its involvement in Muslim lands and support of Israel takes 
immediate precedence over other concerns. This is an outgrowth of its 
ideological self-perception as an elite vanguard of pure Islam ushering in a 
                                                 
49 See Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists”; 
Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”; Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda’s Grievances 
in Context: Reconciling Sharia and Society,” International Relations 30 no. 4 (2016): 473–493; 
Reza Pankhurst, “The Caliphate, and The Changing Strategy of the Public Statements of Al-
Qaeda's Leaders,” Political Theology 11 no. 4 (2010): 530–552; Note that this has undergone 
some revisionism since the breakaway of the Islamic State, resetting the ideology of state-
building once again in the undefined future: see discussion on the “master plan” in Chapter 1. 
50 See Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists”; Gal 
Luft, “Al Qaeda’s Economic War against the United States,” Journal of Energy Security, 
January 24, 2005. 
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populist wave of Islamization. In the service of their Manichean struggle with 
the Crusaders and Zionists, al-Qaeda views itself as an exemplar of 
collaboration and leadership among jihadis engaged in this struggle.51 
Qualitative Analysis Codes/Categories 
From the summary above, nine qualitative analysis codes/categories can 
be derived. A tenth code is also necessary as an addendum: on the matter of the 
relationship between Salafi jihadists and modernity, scholarly opinion is very 
fractious and lacks consensus. Some scholars view Salafist jihadi ideology, and 
often Islamism overall, as existentially anti-modern.52 Other scholars contend 
that Salafi jihadism is a thoroughly modern phenomenon.53 This scholarly 
disagreement extends to modernity vis-à-vis the Islamic State.54 This study’s 
project of generating a granular image of the Islamic State’s ideology provides 
                                                 
51 See Keeney and Winterfeldt, “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists”; 
Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”; Bernard Haykel, “Al-Qa’ida and Shiism,” in 
Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic and Ideological Fissures, Assaf 
Moghdam and Brian Fishman (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2011), 185–202. Importantly, 
Haykel’s examination elaborates on the tension between the relatively moderate Salafi position 
on sectarianism, and differing ideological camps more generally, taken by al-Qaeda upper 
leadership – and the much more radical and sectarian elements in Iraq. These latter elements 
were Zarqawi and those who later formed the core of the Islamic State. 
52 See, for example: Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Anthony F. Roberts 
(trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Farhad Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism: 
Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide (New York: Routledge, 2008); Bassam Tibi, The 
Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age,” 537. 
Notably, Steger treats modernity as a sort of object that, like the international order and the 
nation-state, al-Qaeda seeks to Islamize. 
53 See, for example: John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1998); Muhammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in 
the Muslim World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008); John Gray, Al-Qaeda 
and What it Means to be Modern, (London: Faber, 2003); Assaf Moghdam and Brian Fishman 
(eds.), Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (New 
York: Routledge, 2011). Overall, the Moghdam and Fishman volume conveys a sense of an 
inherently ambivalent modernity to Salafist jihadism.  
54 For an example asserting the Islamic State’s anti-modernity, see Gerges, ISIS: A History; On 
the other hand, John Gray has asserted the essential modernity of the Islamic State, see John 
Gray, “The Anomaly of Barbarism: The Brutality of Islamist Terrorism has Many Precedents,” 
Lapham’s Quarterly 9 no. 2 (2016). 
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an opportunity for that image to potentially address the scholarly ambiguity over 
Salafi jihadism and modernity. Thus, a tenth modernity code/category will be 
added to this study’s qualitative analysis.  
The following is a list of codes/categories generated for this study’s 
qualitative analysis from the summary above: 
1. International Order 
2. Arab-Israeli Conflict 
3. Sectarianism 
4. Violence/Combat 
5. Islamic Governance 
6. State-Building (Caliphate) 
7. Economics 
8. Other Jihadist Organizations 
9. Self-Image 
10. Modernity 
While these codes/categories can be used in this study’s qualitative analysis of 
Dabiq and Rumiya, there needs to be something readily available against which 
to compare the resultant qualitative data, which is outlined below. 
Comparable Salafist Jihadi Ideology, as Expected by Scholarship 
The above summary of the scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi ideology 
must be made useful for the comparison required to answer this study’s research 
questions. To accomplish this, that summary has been condensed into discrete 
units. These units correspond to the various ideological aspects of Salafist 
jihadism as understood by scholarly consensus and serves as an indicator of 
what is expected from the ideology of the Islamic State by that consensus. There 
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are thirty-six of these indicators in total. These are listed below, organized by 
code/category:   
1. International Order 
1. Illegitimate and Un-Islamic 
2. Westernized Post-Ottoman International Order (Jahiliyyah) 
3. To be Islamized Overall 
4. Nation-States to be Islamized individually 
5. Confederation of Islamic polities 
6. End of Terrorism Contingent on West withdrawing from Islamic 
lands/Destruction of Israel 
2. Arab-Israeli Conflict 
7. Destruction of Israel 
8. Jews to be Destroyed/Expelled 
9. High Priority 
10. Support of Palestinian Authority 
11. Support of Hamas 
12. Support of Palestinian Nationalism 
13. End of Terrorism Contingent on West withdrawing from Islamic 
lands/Destruction of Israel  
3. Sectarianism 
14. Low Priority 
15. Disputes Sidelined until West expelled from Muslim Lands and Israel 
Destroyed 
16. Willing to collaborate across the Sunni-Shia Divide 
4. Violence/Combat 
17. Focus on Mass-Casualty Terror Attacks 
18. Focus on “Far Enemy”/Western/US Targets 
19. Support local insurgency against Western intervention 
20. Avoid Gruesome Execution of Enemies 
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5. Islamic Governance 
21. Sharia-based Government only Legitimate Government 
22. Supports Islamizing the structures of Extant Muslim States 
23. Inspire Muslims to self-Islamize their own States (populist) 
6. State-Building (Caliphate) 
24. Low priority 
25. Long-term goal 
26. Not possible until defeat of “Far Enemy” 
27. Islamization of Extant States into an Islamic Confederation 
7. Economics 
28. Support through donations 
29. Economic Warfare Against the West (Bleeding) 
30. Islamize Global Economy through Transfer of Wealth (Oil) 
8. Other Jihadists Organizations 
31. Willing to Collaborate 
32. Willing to affiliate even if ideologically different 
33. Avoid Conflict with other organizations  
9. Self-Image 
34. An Elite Vanguard of Pure Islam 
35. Ushering in Populist Wave of Islamization 
36. Locked in Manichean Struggle with West (Crusaders and Zionists) 
These indicators will be utilized after the results of this study’s qualitative 
analysis are obtained. 
Results of Qualitative Analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah 
Stage One of QA on Dabiq and Rumiyah, coding the text, generated 2,100 coded 
segments. Of these: 364 were coded for International Order (17.33%); 13 were 
coded for Arab-Israeli Conflict (0.62%); 287 were coded for Sectarianism 
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(13.67%); 295 were coded for Violence/Combat (14%); 266 were coded for 
Islamic Governance (12.67%); 260 were coded for State-Building (Caliphate) 
(12.38%); 45 were coded for Economics (2.14%); 149 were coded for Other 
Jihadist Organizations (7.10%); 364 were coded for Self-Image (17.33%); and 
57 were coded for Modernity (2.71%). 
Stage Two of QA on Dabiq and Rumiyah, analyzing the coded text, 
generated 373 distinctive ideological elements. Of these:  74 elements were 
derived on the International Order (19.89%); 9 elements were derived on the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict (2.42%); 44 elements were derived on Sectarianism 
(11.83%); 64 elements were derived on Violence/Combat (17%); 29 elements 
were derived on Islamic Governance (7.80%); 43 elements were derived on 
State-Building (Caliphate) (11.56%); 26 elements were derived on Economics 
(6.99%); 17 elements were derived on Other Jihadist Organizations (4.57%); 56 
elements were derived on Self-Image (15.05%); and 10 elements were derived 
on Modernity (2.69%). The complete list of these ideological elements is 
recorded in total in Appendix A.  
Stage Three of QA on Dabiq and Rumiyah, deriving Islamic State 
ideology, generated an overview of the Islamic State’s ideology by context 
code/category. This overview is recorded in the following chapter, where this 
study turns to answering its research questions. 
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Chapter 3: Discussion 
With the first three stages of QA on Dabiq and Rumiyah complete, Stage Four 
applies the results to this study’s research questions. The results of Stage Three 
are recorded below as the answer to the first research question:  
What is the Ideology of the Islamic State? 
On the International Order 
The international order is illegitimate because it is un-Islamic. The Ottoman 
Empire’s adoption of Westernized idolatries led the Muslim world to ruin and 
allowed for its destruction. The international order is a Westernized imposition 
by “Crusaders and Zionists” that is fundamentally hostile toward Muslims. The 
global culture of this international order exists in a state of contemporary 
jahiliyyah (mirroring the religious ignorance of pre-Islamic Arabia), which must 
be destroyed and replaced by a revival of the Muslim world in the form of the 
Islamic State’s Caliphate. Nation-states are born out of the idolatry of 
nationalism, as such they must all be destroyed and replaced by the Caliphate. 
At length, the whole of the Western international order is to be destroyed and 
replaced in this fashion. Terror attacks can never truly end; however, a 
temporary truce might be possible if the Crusaders cease their violence against 
Muslims and end their support for apostate regimes and the State of Israel.  
On the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
While Israel must be destroyed, and its Jews subjected to paying the jizya, this is 
a low priority. At its core, the Arab-Israeli Conflict is rife with apostasy. The 
idolatry of Palestinian nationalism must be destroyed first before the Jewish 
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state can be dealt with appropriately. The Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and 
especially Hezbollah are apostate organizations which must be destroyed. The 
Islamic State rejects Palestinian nationalism along with all other Western-
derived idolatries.  
On Sectarianism 
The Islamic State holds sectarianism as its highest priority, to the extent that 
they view the world as two distinctive camps: the Islamic State as the true 
manifestation of Islam, and the world of idolatry encompassing everything and 
everyone else. This paramount focus on sectarian disputes is such that the 
Islamic State holds that it must annihilate apostasy within Muslim lands before 
the “Far Enemy” of the West can effectively be fought. For them, the Sunni-
Shia divide is unbridgeable – the Shia must be eradicated. This underscores why 
fighting Israel is a secondary concern in the Islamic State’s ideology – all the 
apostasy that exists must be destroyed first. Only when united can the Muslims 
succeed in destroying Israel and the Crusaders who support it.  
On Violence/Combat 
In terms of violence and combat, the ideological focus is on the 
conquest/liberation of Muslim lands under apostate rule. While there is also a 
focus on terror attacks on targets in the West, this focus is less urgent and not 
necessarily mass-casualty oriented. Rather, the Islamic State seeks to inspire 
individual Muslims worldwide to engage in spontaneous violence against the 
Crusaders in their own homelands, with an emphasis on the frequency of 
violence rather than on the scale.  The emphasis on localized conquest and 
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expansion follows from the logic that the Muslim lands must be united before 
the “Far Enemy” can be effectively fought, which is to say that the “Islamic 
Giant” must rise again as the existential opponent of the Crusaders. In line with 
the Islamic State’s intense ideological sectarianism, publicizing the gruesome 
execution of captured Crusaders and apostates is emphasized, on the logic that it 
will strike terror into the enemies of Islam and raise the morale of the Muslims. 
On Islamic Governance 
The only possible legitimate government is one based upon Islamic law (sharia), 
and the Islamic State is the only entity capable or even willing to implement 
such a government. It is not possible to Islamize the idolatrous institutions of 
nation-states or democratic systems – they must be destroyed and replaced by 
the Caliphate. To this end, the Islamic State calls Muslims to leave their 
homelands and immigrate to its territories and be a part of the construction of 
the Islamic State’s holistic Islamic governance.  
On State-Building (Caliphate) 
State-building, through the establishment and expansion of the revived Caliphate 
in the present, is the obligation of all Muslims and of supreme ideological 
importance. It is the item of highest priority, upon which all other ideological 
aspects are predicated. Only state-building can unify the Muslims and enable 
them to defeat the “Far Enemy” and the State of Israel. Only destroying the 
extant nation-states in Muslims lands and replacing them with the ever-growing 
Caliphate can preserve Islam from the pollution of Western idolatries. It is 
impossible to Islamize the extant nation-states, as they were born out of idolatry 
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and Crusader machinations. Rather, the Islamic State, while forthcoming about 
the hardships they will face, calls Muslims to abandon those nation-states and 
join with the Islamic State in destroying the current world and rebuilding a 
Muslim world in its place. 
On Economics 
The Islamic State’s ideology on economics, in the same vein as state-building, is 
oriented toward destroying the extant global economy – which is used by the 
international order as a weapon to oppress and enslave Muslims – and building 
an Islamic economy in its place. To this end, such an economy is primarily war 
booty based. The wealth captured by jihadis through combat with apostate and 
Crusader forces is to be redistributed within the Islamic State for the purposes of 
state-building and seeing to the well-being of Muslims. This includes a focus on 
the targeting of fiat currencies and the petrodollar for replacement by a gold 
standard. Not unlike other Western ideologies, these features of the global 
economy are inherently un-Islamic, and thus must be destroyed. To that end, the 
Islamic State seeks to seize the oil production of Muslim lands and force the rest 
of the world to pay for petroleum in physical gold, thereby weakening and 
ultimately destroying the petrodollar system and, ultimately, fiat currencies and 
the current global economy. 
On Other Jihadist Organizations 
The Islamic State holds that any non-apostate jihadi group will swear allegiance 
to and join the Islamic State, thereby dissolving itself into its broader force of 
jihadis. Thus, it is unwilling to work with other jihadist organizations as 
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distinctive entities, especially not those whose ideology differs from its own. In 
that aspect, the sectarianism of the Islamic State’s ideology comes to the fore – 
it refuses to collaborate or affiliate with groups it deems to be apostate. Rather, 
such “so-called” jihadist organizations must be actively fought until they are 
destroyed, or its members have repented and abandoned it for the Islamic State.  
On Self-Image 
The Islamic State’s ideological self-perception is that of an egalitarian state for 
all Muslims and the only site in the world that holds to and serves true Islam. 
The Islamic State exists as a refuge and a fortress for Muslims against a world of 
darkness, idolatry, and apostasy. From this fortress, the Islamic State stages its 
Manichean struggle with the Crusaders and Zionists, as well as their apostate 
slave proxies. The Islamic State is where the ingathering of sincere Muslims will 
take place – it will then surge outward, washing over the world and purging it of 
idolatry until all that remains is the Caliphate. The Islamic State views itself as 
the literal manifestation of the dichotomy between Islam and idolatry. People 
have two choices: either the Islamic State or the Flood. 
 On Modernity 
The Islamic State identifies “modernity” as code for Westernization, and thus 
for idolatry. Rather that meaning anything particularly special, the “modern” is 
simply a designation of time – that which is contemporary. The language of so-
called “modernity” is used to deceive Muslims into Westernized apostasy. 
Things such as secularism, liberalism, nationalism, democracy, and communism 
are not “modernity,” they are merely contemporary Western idolatries. Just like 
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racism, another element of the Crusaders’ precious “modernity,” these idolatries 
have no place among the Muslims. The Islamic State also rejects the notion that 
“modernity” is the source of contemporary scientific and technical advances, 
and instead contends that these are all the result of the natural capacities of the 
human mind which God endowed upon mankind. 
How Does Islamic State Ideology Differ from Current Scholarly 
Understanding of Salafist Jihadism? 
Having established the ideology of the Islamic State, this ideology can be 
compared against the scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi ideology.  
Charting Differences 
Scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadism would expect the ideology of the 
Islamic State to share the thirty-six indicators of ideology derived for 
comparison in the previous chapter. This is to say that when the overview of the 
Islamic State’s ideology in the previous section is compared to the indicators 
from Chapter 2, the scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadism would expect 
them to match: they should share the same indicators of ideology. However, 
when this comparison is charted on the table below, a very different picture 
begins to emerge: 
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Table 1 - Scholarly Understanding v. Islamic State Ideology 
Expected Indicators IS Indicator Match 
1.1) Illegitimate and Un-Islamic Yes 
1.2) Westernized Post-Ottoman International Order (Jahiliyyah) No 
1.3) To be Islamized Overall No 
1.4) Nation-States to be Islamized individually No 
1.5) Confederation of Islamic polities No 
1.6) End of Terrorism Contingent on West withdrawing from Islamic lands/ 
Destruction of Israel 
No 
2.7) Destruction of Israel Yes 
2.8) Jews to be Destroyed/Expelled No 
2.9) High Priority No 
2.10) Support of PA No 
2.11) Support of Hamas No 
2.12) Support of Palestinian Nationalism No 
2.13) End of Terrorism Contingent on West withdrawing from Islamic lands/ 
Destruction of Israel 
No 
3.14) Low Priority No 
3.15) Disputes Sidelined until West expelled from Muslim Lands and Israel Destroyed No 
3.16) Willing to collaborate across the Sunni-Shia Divide No 
4.17) Focus on Mass-Casualty Terror Attacks No 
4.18) Focus on “Far Enemy”/Western/US Targets No 
4.19) Support local insurgency against Western intervention No 
4.20) Avoid Gruesome Execution of Enemies No 
5.21) Sharia-based Government only Legitimate Government Yes 
5.22) Supports Islamizing the structures of Extant Muslim States No 
5.23) Inspire Muslims to self-Islamize their own States (populist) No 
6.24) Low priority No 
6.25) Long-term goal No 
6.26) Not possible until defeat of “Far Enemy” No 
6.27) Islamization of Extant States into an Islamic Confederation No 
7.28) Support through donations No 
7.29) Economic Warfare Against the West (Bleeding) No 
7.30) Islamize Global Economy through Transfer of Wealth (Oil) No 
8.31) Willing to Collaborate No 
8.32) Willing to affiliate even if ideologically different No 
8.33) Avoid Conflict with other organizations No 
9.34) An Elite Vanguard of Pure Islam No 
9.35) Ushering in Populist Wave of Islamization No 
9.36) Locked in Manichean Struggle with West (Crusaders and Zionists) Yes 
As seen above, the ideology of the Islamic State appears to fall well outside of 
contemporary scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadism. Of the thirty-six 
expected indicators of Salafist jihadi ideology within the scholarly corpus, the 
Islamic State shares only four: that the international order is illegitimate and un-
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Islamic; that Israel must be destroyed; that only sharia-based government is 
legitimate; and that Muslims are locked in a Manichean struggle with the West’s 
Crusaders and Zionists. These four shared ideological aspects reflect the 
contours of Salafist jihadism in only the broadest strokes of scholarly 
understanding, but in none of the granular ideological details. Notably, these 
shared indicators are found amongst Salafists overall – even non-violent 
Salafists – and amongst fundamentalist Islamists more generally.55 
Chi Square Test 
The chi square statistical hypothesis test is used to determine the relationship 
between a variable and its indicators. It can be used to determine how the 
ideology of the Islamic State relates to what should be expected of that ideology 
based on current scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadism. 
 Within a chi square test, the expectation that Islamic State ideology 
exhibits a close relationship with scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi 
ideology represents the null hypothesis (H0) and would be reflected by a low chi 
square statistic and a high P-Value (above 0.05). The alternative hypothesis (Ha), 
that there is little or no relationship between Islamic State ideology and 
scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi ideology, would be reflected by a high 
chi square statistic and a low P-Value (below 0.05). The formula for the chi 
square statistic is given below:  
                                                 
55 See, for example Barak Mendelssohn, “God vs. Westphalia: Radical Islamist Movements and 
the Battle for Organizing the World,” Review of International Studies 38 no. 3 (2012): 589–613. 
Here, Mendelsohn compares al-Qaeda as the benchmark of Salafist jihadism to its non-violent 
political Salafist counterpart Hizb ut-Tahir (Party of Liberation). 
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𝑥𝑐
2 =∑
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
 
Where: 
Oi = Observed in Category (Number of IS Indicator Matches from Table 1) 
Ei = Expected in Category (Number of Expected Indicators from Table 1)  
The chi square statistic and P-Value are worked out in the table below: 
Table 2 - Chi Square Statistic/P-Value 
Category 𝑂𝑖  𝐸𝑖 
𝑂𝑖 −
𝐸𝑖   (𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2 
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
 
1. International Order 1 6 -5 25 4.16666667 
2. Arab-Israeli Conflict 1 7 -6 36 5.14285714 
3. Sectarianism 0 3 -3 9 3 
4. Violence/Combat 0 4 -4 16 4 
5. Islamic Governance 1 3 -2 4 1.33 
6. State-Building (Caliphate) 0 4 -4 16 4 
7. Economics 0 3 -3 9 3 
8. Other Jihadist Orgs 0 3 -3 9 3 
9. Self-Image 1 3 -2 4 1.33 
      
    
Chi Square: 28.9695238 
    P-Value: 0.00032016 
   
As seen in the table above, the chi square statistic is very high while the P-Value 
is very low, which reflects that the null hypothesis (H0) should be rejected in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis (Ha): that there is little or no relationship 
between Islamic State ideology and scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadi 
ideology. This underscores what is apparent from the charting in Table 1: the 
ideology of the Islamic State is categorically different from Salafist jihadi 
ideology as it is understood within scholarship.  
  Further, the low P-Value indicates that it is unlikely that such broad 
differences are random noise, or that the Islamic State’s ideology is so radically 
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different from scholarly understanding of Salafist jihadism by chance alone. 
Such vast differences beg some explanation, leading into the study’s next 
research question.  
What is the Meaning of these Differences? 
The meaning of these differences, and their scope, is well illustrated by 
returning to the matter of the “master plan” compromise that initially brought 
Zarqawi and al-Qaeda together in 2004. What was important about this 
compromise is that it glossed over the ideological differences between Zarqawi 
and senior al-Qaeda leadership rather than resolving them. Sidestepping the 
issue of sectarian violence entirely, which was the matter upon which al-Qaeda’s 
senior leadership and Zarqawi were most at odds, the “master plan” essentially 
took al-Qaeda’s ideological long-view and overlaid a timetable upon it.56 
 This was meant to mollify Zarqawi away from behaviors which the 
leadership of al-Qaeda found ideologically objectionable, especially his intense 
violence against the Shia of Iraq. Importantly, this sectarianism loggerhead had 
roots far deeper than Zarqawi’s activities in Iraq following the US invasion – 
this had been an issue between the leadership of al-Qaeda and Zarqawi since 
their first collaboration within Afghanistan in 1999.57 By positing a discrete 
timetable, the master plan’s original author, Sayf al-Adl, hoped to form a bridge 
between the ideological demands of Zarqawi and his people for immediate and 
                                                 
56 Fishman, The Master Plan, 34-36. 
57 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What 
Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 116-117. 
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tangible work toward establishing the Caliphate and al-Qaeda’s ideological 
desire that sectarian violence be sidelined in Iraq.58  
Ultimately, this bridge failed, as Zarqawi would turn to alternative 
(unofficial) avenues of fostering sectarian warfare in Iraq, and following his 
death in a 2006 American airstrike, the leadership of al-Qaeda ceased to adhere 
to this timetable. Al-Qaeda’s abandonment of the master plan is a major part of 
the Islamic State’s critique of al-Qaeda as an apostate group and their response 
to the refusal of al-Qaeda to integrate itself into the Caliphate – which the 
Islamic State declared in 2014 within the framework of al-Adl’s master plan. 
Accordingly, as per that master plan, al-Qaeda should have folded itself into the 
Islamic State’s military and bureaucratic structure upon its advent as the 
renewed Caliphate. Thus, in the eyes of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda is guilty both 
of apostasy and a betrayal of an agreed upon course of action that had been in 
place for a decade.59 
What is key here is that despite the attempts by both al-Qaeda’s 
leadership and Zarqawi’s AQI to use each other in the pursuit of their own 
goals, the two groups never shared the same ideology. Moreover, the successors 
of Zarqawi quickly became even more extreme than he had been, owing to the 
history of the Iraq which had provided his sectarianism such fertile ground in the 
first place.60 The focus on al-Qaeda and the perception of the group as the leader 
                                                 
58 Fishman, The Master Plan, 34. 
59 Al-Hayat Media Center, Dabiq, No.1: The Return of the Khilafah, July 5, 2014, 34-35. 
60 This included, of course, a history of sectarian social organization and rule since the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as the increasingly anti-Iranian/Shia sectarian rhetoric of the latter-day 
Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, and the long history of weaponized rape in the environs. 
See, Gershon Lewental, “‘Saddam’s Qadisiyyah’: Religion and History in the Service of State 
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of a Salafist “global jihad” by scholarly and policy circles left both thoroughly 
unprepared to understand the Islamic State when it “suddenly” appeared and 
began behaving in a manner strikingly different from the al-Qaeda benchmark.   
From a scholastic and policy perspective, the ideological differences 
represented by the Islamic State mean that a reevaluation of Salafist jihadism is 
needed within scholarly and policy circles. The categorical differences between 
the Islamic State’s ideology and what scholarship on Salafist jihadism would 
expect questions the utility of al-Qaeda as the benchmark of Salafist jihadism, at 
least in its current formulation. This is highlighted by the current state of al-
Qaeda itself, which appears to have begun an as yet unclear ideological shift, 
both following the death of Osama bin Laden and in response to the Islamic 
State’s challenge to its self-perception as the cutting edge of jihad.  
For instance, al-Qaeda has become willing to engage in support actions 
and power sharing with non-Islamist elements both in Yemen and in Syria – 
turning even more sharply away from the earlier master plan that brought al-
Qaeda and Zarqawi together during the American occupation of Iraq.61 Notably, 
this has also been a major issue of contention that the Islamic State has with 
post-bin Laden al-Qaeda.62 Beyond this, the ideology of al-Qaeda’s leadership is 
experiencing a certain degradation amongst its own affiliates. Al-Nusra Front, 
once al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, for example, has spun away from al-Qaeda 
                                                                                                                                   
Ideology in Baʿthi Iraq,” Middle Eastern Studies 50 no. 6 (2014): 891–910; Ariel I. Ahram, 
“Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57 no. 3 (2015): 57–78.  
61 See, for example: Ben Hubbard, “Al Qaeda Tries a New Tactic to Keep Power: Sharing It,” 
The New York Times, 7-9-2015; recall also that the trend has developed where scholars now 
deny that the “master plan” was ever normative, whereas before, it was extolled as an exemplar 
of al-Qaeda’s benchmark status. 
62 Al-Hayat Media Center, Dabiq, No.10: The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men, July 13, 2015, 
67–69. 
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and merged with roughly one-hundred other Salafist jihadi groups fighting in the 
Syrian Civil War – forming the conglomeration Tahrir al-Sham.63 While these 
developments don’t give any clear indication what direction (or more likely – 
directions) Salafist jihadi ideology will move in the future, the current use of the 
core of al-Qaeda as a benchmark is experiencing diminishing returns of 
analytical robustness.64  
  
                                                 
63 Alaa Addin Ismail, “Tahrir al-Sham Arrests of Qaeda Leaders Cranks up Zawahiri – Julani 
Dispute,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 11-30-2017. Notably, while it has broken off from al-Qaeda into its 
own group, Tahrir al-Sham has not experienced the same ideological rejection of nationalism as 
the Islamic State. 
64 There is an increasing trend where predictions based on the persistent al-Qaeda benchmark are 
quickly shown to be incorrect by sea changes within Salafi jihadism. For the “master plan” as an 
entrenched al-Qaeda facet months before its rejection, see Rudner, “Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year 
Strategic Plan”; For the real-world uselessness of Salafist jihadi internet media months before 
the Islamic State breakaway and its highly successful use of the internet, see Barak Mendelsohn, 
“Al Qaeda and Global Governance: When Ideology Clashes with Political Expediency,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26 no. 3 (2014): 470–487; For al-Qaeda’s firm control over 
Nusra months before the group’s breakaway, see Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise, 192–
193. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Moving forward, reevaluation of Salafist jihadi ideology is going to require a 
mindfulness of the pitfalls of basing analyses on any one group for use as a 
benchmark. Such mindfulness is of increasing importance given that there is 
possibly an emergent break within Salafist jihadism overall into three generally 
distinct ideological divisions. For example, while most Salafist jihadis fall into 
either the “Far Enemy” or “Near Enemy” ideological camps, both seek to unseat 
the power of and then Islamize the extant states of the international order along 
Salafist lines. The Islamic State, on the other hand, represents a third ideological 
camp that seeks to destroy extant states and the international order outright, and 
replace it all with an entirely new Salafist world order. 
An Emergent Shift in Salafi Jihadi Ideology on Muslim Unity 
 What is important within this emergent break represented by the Islamic 
State is a fundamental difference in the ideological concept of Muslim unity, 
specifically, what manner of Muslim unification is ideologically legitimate. This 
is the core of the categorical difference between the ideology of the Islamic 
State and scholarly understanding of Salafi jihadism in its current formulation. 
Al-Qaeda and other Salafist jihadi groups believe that it is ideologically 
legitimate to act upon the extant international order and alter it. When taken 
more broadly among fundamentalists, this is generally referred to as 
Islamization. But in the case of Salafist groups, both violent and non-violent, 
there is a particular distinction that is more accurately called “Salafication.” The 
idea is to take the existing order and shape it (through a process of jihad or 
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through activism), and the Muslims within it, into as close a facsimile of early 
Islamic society as possible. It is this processional nature, with its intention to 
take the existing world and alter it into something sufficiently or recognizably 
Salafi, that allows al-Qaeda and other Salafi jihadist groups to engage with state 
actors and treat with more ideologically diverse allies. 
 However, for the Islamic State, this approach to Muslim unification is 
ideologically illegitimate. Informed by its ideological sectarianism and 
takfirism, the ideology of the Islamic State demands that Muslim unity be 
achieved by destroying the existing world and replacing it outright. Thus, state-
building is an ideological requirement for the Islamic State. In a sense, they see 
themselves as literally recreating the world. More specifically, they are 
recreating a Muslim world that ceased to exist with the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. This recreated world will expand as it conquers and destroys an ever-
larger part of the Western-dominated world, encompassing Muslims as it grows 
and, in this way, achieving Muslim unity – by repeating the method of the early 
Islamic conquests. 
 This fundamentally different ideological conception of Muslim 
unification at the core of the Islamic State’s ideology has been largely missed by 
scholarship utilizing the al-Qaeda benchmark. This scholarship has identified the 
Islamic State’s expansion and state-building as merely an alternative choice of 
praxis akin to, but ideologically indistinguishable from, al-Qaeda’s franchising 
strategy.65 Scholarly consideration of this shift in ideology on Muslim 
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unification is essential to developing an updated scholarly understanding of 
Salafi jihadism. 
Problems for Future Research 
Along with this consideration, there are several particular problems which study 
of Salafist jihadism will need to address or avoid in reevaluating the 
phenomenon. These are discussed below.   
The Problem of Participation in Islamic Discourse 
Throughout the duration of the international community’s fight against the 
Islamic State, academics of both scholarly and policy circles have been drawn 
into the discourse of the Islamic world over the definitional limits of Islam. 
While this has been something of an issue since the War on Terror began, the 
advent of the Islamic State in 2014 has exacerbated this problem substantially. 
The participation within this discourse vis-à-vis the Islamic State has taken its 
most immediately visible form on the matter of names: specifically, the use of 
the term “Daesh” to refer to the Islamic State.   
 Use of the term “Daesh” as a derogatory name for the Islamic State 
began as part of the discourse amongst Muslims in opposition to the Islamic 
State and its ideological vision of Islam – at heart, part of the wider discourse on 
the definition of Islam. Coined in 2013 by Syrian activist Khaled al-Haj Salih, 
the Arabic acronym rendered in English as “Daesh” is a linguistic combination 
of “counter-takfirism,” satire, and insult.66 On one level, acronyms in Arabic are 
uncommon, so taken as a word, “Daesh” is a gibberish word without meaning – 
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and it is used in this way to delegitimize the Islamic State in Islamic discourse.67 
Further, this acronym is one letter different from the word daes, meaning 
“someone or something that crushes or tramples,” and this similarity is 
employed as an insult against the Islamic State’s claims to be rebuilding the 
Muslim world.68 Finally, and here is where the element of “counter-takfirism” 
comes in to play, Khaled al-Haj Salih elaborates that “both the shape of the 
word [‘Daesh’] and the combination of letters in it are redolent of words from 
al-jahaliyya, the pre-Islamic dark ages,” and thus calling the group “Daesh” 
pronounces the group’s un-Islamic nature.69 
The Islamic State considers the term “Daesh” a grave insult to itself, and, 
moreover, a besmirchment of Islam, threatening and carrying out violence 
against any who use it – Khaled al-Haj Salih was forced to flee Syria after the 
term’s proliferation there.70 Soon thereafter, demands were made by figures in 
the Muslim world that both news media outlets and political leaders also use the 
term “Daesh.”71 This usage quickly began to filter into scholarly and policy 
circles as well.72 
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 While it may be reasonable, if dubious, for this trend to occur within 
media outlets or in the political leadership, it is counterproductive to use 
“Daesh” in scholarly or policy circles, if for no other reason than a surreptitious 
designation of the Islamic State as inherently un-Islamic guts any capacity for 
granular or useful analysis of the group’s ideology, which is a problem already 
difficult enough to approach due to the increasingly outmoded persistence of al-
Qaeda as a benchmark for Salafist jihadism. Further, the use of “Daesh” cuts 
against the general academic standard where the self-identification of a group is 
given pride of place in terminology.73 If this pride of place is maintained for 
groups as disparate as the alt-Right and the Latinx community, the same must 
also apply to the Islamic State.  
 Further, academic participation within this discourse can generate 
adverse effects, whether intended or not. For instance, Zeba Khan, a JSK Fellow 
at Stanford University and one of the most vocal proponents for the use of 
“Daesh” outside the broader Islamic community, posits that its use will 
undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic State.74 However, Khan also reiterates 
that “American officials should not be in the business of telling Muslims at 
home or abroad who is or isn’t Muslim.”75  
There are significant problems with Khan’s contentions. First, the 
Islamic State is ultimately unconcerned with its legitimacy in the eyes of any 
entities other than itself and God – and is content to present its ideology and let 
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it speak for itself. Second, it is impossible for American officials to adopt 
“Daesh” as a terminology without it being anything other than “telling Muslims 
at home or abroad who is or isn’t Muslim” – this much is clear from the very 
nature of the term itself as elaborated above. Moreover, the proliferation of its 
use has resulted ultimately in a violent manifestation of “the business of telling 
Muslims at home or abroad who is or isn’t Muslim.”  
This process was already underway, even before usage of the term 
“Daesh” proliferated and exacerbated it, from the moment then President Barak 
Obama decided to involve the United States and lead the fight against the 
Islamic State:  
Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not “Islamic.” No religion 
condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL’s 
victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was 
formerly al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq, and has taken advantage of sectarian 
strife and Syria’s civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-
Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor by the people it 
subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has 
no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way.76 
Aside from the general fallacy that “terrorism” is some discrete thing rather than 
a strategic praxis in the employ of an ideology, Obama’s statement did two 
things simultaneously. First, ironically, it pronounced “counter-takfir” on the 
Islamic State. Second, it made a broad statement of what defines Islam and 
placed the Islamic State outside of that definition.77 This statement gelled with 
the proliferation of the term “Daesh” and set the tone for what has come after.  
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On the one hand, we have the Islamic State declaring who is and is not 
Muslim and punctuating that declaration with the force of arms. On the other, 
we have an American-led Coalition doing the same, under the banner “The 
Global Coalition Against Daesh” since September of 2014.78 Hence, far beyond 
American officials being in the business of telling Muslims at home or abroad 
who is or isn’t Muslim, the advocacy of Zeba Khan and other academics has 
resulted in the officials from scores of states and institutions outside the Islamic 
discourse in the business of doing so.79  
 Unsurprisingly, the Islamic State has taken note of this paradigm and 
employed it in its general ideological narrative.80 This paradigm of designating 
groups, especially the Islamic State, as un-Islamic in policy statements or 
through the proliferation of the use of the term “Daesh” since 2014 across media 
outlets, political leadership, academia, and policy circles has not done anything 
to undercut Islamic State ideology. Rather, it has provided Islamic State 
ideology with further validating proofs of the Manichean nature of its 
worldview: 
Certainly, O America, you know that you have no savior. You have 
become prey for the soldiers of the Khilafah in every region of the earth. 
You have become bankrupt and the signs of your end are apparent and 
visible to the eyes. There is no better evidence of this than that an 
uncouth idiot [President Trump] has assumed authority over you, while 
he has no idea what Sham is, what Iraq is, and what Islam is – yet he still 
raves about showing enmity to it and declaring war against it.81 
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In consideration of the global proliferation of Islamic State inspired violence 
since 2014, the participation of the West in Islamic discourse has at most proven 
to be an ineffectual and empty gesture, and at worst has aided the Islamic State 
in the presentation of its ideological position to potentially sympathetic 
Muslims. It is senseless for professionals in ostensibly fact-based fields of 
academics and foreign policy analysis to choose one side of an ongoing 
kulturkampf and adopt it as definitive. This practice should be avoided and the 
use of “Daesh” as a term for the Islamic State in scholarly and policy circles is 
best abandoned. 
The Problem of “Holographic” Ideology: Rhetoric vs. Reality and 
Quantification 
Throughout the duration of the Islamic State’s time as a nascent state, its media 
releases about its state-building and other endeavors were generally written off 
by scholars and politicians as propaganda whose rhetoric could not match the 
reality of its territories, a stance informed by the al-Qaeda Salafist jihadi 
benchmark and that group’s long history of media rhetoric in the absence of 
action.82  
Yet, these sorts of dismissals are questionable when directed at the 
Islamic State’s media. While the media rhetoric of al-Qaeda is intended to curate 
and preserve its reputation in the Muslim world, this is of little concern to the 
Islamic State. Further, substantial documentary evidence and testimonials of 
Islamic State endeavors have been recovered from its former territories, as noted 
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in Chapter One.83 These endeavors were communicated to its media audience, 
while maintaining a forthcoming honesty about those efforts as a work in 
progress which would mean certain hardship for the Muslim who answered their 
call to join the Islamic State, as clearly reflected in the overview of the Islamic 
State’s state-building ideology laid out in Chapter Three. This reflects more of a 
paradigm where its ideological rhetoric reflected reality, rather than one of 
propaganda rhetoric juxtaposed against reality. This is also clear in the Islamic 
State’s media releases of an economic nature. 
The Islamic State expended considerable time and resources in the 
pursuit of economic endeavors to actualize the economic aspects of its ideology 
seen in Chapter Three. This included the cultivation of revenue streams such as: 
petroleum, extortion and taxation, phosphates, and cement, among others.84 
Though this economic structure was ultimately destroyed, the Islamic State had 
a relatively stable economy in 2014, with its international trade remaining 
largely intact despite Coalition efforts at least until late 2015. Moreover, until 
that point, the Islamic State maintained a relatively more secure business 
environment than adjacent regions, such that it succeeded in attracting 
significant foreign direct investment from across the region – mirroring the 
relatively more advanced public services of its state-building efforts.85 These 
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efforts also included the Islamic State’s attempt to revive the gold-standard by 
minting its own dinars, which had been announced initially in Dabiq and then 
unveiled through the release of a pair of high-production value videos 
elaborating on their ideological reasoning at greater length, though the materials 
for this project were ultimately seized by Turkish forces.86 
Like many others on topics of state-building and economics, scholars 
dismissed Islamic State media releases about the gold dinar as propaganda 
rhetoric, in this case both because of the known challenges of running a precious 
metals-based economy and because of the Islamic State’s lack of short-run 
capacity to circulate gold dinars.87 While this may well have been true, they also 
miss the point. The Islamic State’s actual efforts toward minting and circulating 
dinars sought to progressively seize oil production as war booty and begin 
forcing its sale in exchange for gold, while simultaneously attempting to destroy 
the petrodollar system and redistribute this wealth of gold into a Muslim 
economy in the form of minted dinars.88 Vitally, these efforts followed the 
dismissed Islamic State media releases about the gold dinar, and the overall 
economic ideology of the Islamic State laid out in Chapter Three, point for 
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point. The key here is that the Islamic State’s media releases about the gold 
dinar were not propaganda rhetoric, they were policy statements. Whether or not 
the Islamic State could have succeeded in fully carrying out those policy 
statements is, ultimately, irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Islamic State 
acted on them in earnest, and continued to, even as a global military coalition 
repeatedly stymied those efforts and ultimately destroyed its nascent state. Here 
again, rhetoric reflected reality. 
 All of this represents an immediacy inherent to the Islamic State’s 
ideology that the more drawn-out nature of the al-Qaeda benchmark for Salafi 
jihadism provides no frame of reference for. This is a result of the essentially 
“holographic” nature of the Islamic State’s ideology. Like in holography, where 
any given piece of a hologram may be used to instantly reconstruct the whole of 
a holographic image, the Islamic State’s ideology shares a similar quality 
wherein any given piece of its ideology inheres the whole. In this sense, the 
Islamic State views the state of the global economy vis-à-vis Muslims as 
sufficient reason, alone, for the Islamic State’s Caliphal enterprise.  
This applies even to aspects of the Islamic State’s ideology that are of 
apparently lower priority. For example, while the Arab-Israeli Conflict is an 
extremely low priority for the Islamic State, the very existence of a Jewish State 
is likewise sufficient reason, alone, for the Islamic State’s Caliphal enterprise – 
even if its ideological prioritization demands that apostates must be destroyed 
first. This intrinsic quality of Islamic State ideology, its holographic nature, 
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presents a very real problem for quantification in analysis of the Islamic State’s 
ideology.  
While it is tempting to attempt to quantify the ideology of the Islamic 
State, and of Salafist jihadism overall, for the purposes of comparative statistical 
analysis – especially considering the current development of three distinctive 
strains of Salafist jihadi ideology – any approach attempting to quantify Salafist 
jihadi ideology is going to run into the problem of its “holographic” nature. To 
help illustrate this, the numbers corresponding to the results of Stage One and 
State Two of this study’s qualitative analysis have been recorded onto the table 
below: 
Table 3 - Frequency/Percentages of Segments and Ideological Elements 
Code/Category Segment Frequency Element Frequency 
International Order 364 (17.33%) 74 (19.89%) 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 13 (0.62%) 9 (2.42%) 
Sectarianism 287 (13.67%) 44 (11.83%) 
Violence/Combat 295 (14%) 64 (17%) 
Islamic Governance 266 (12.67%) 29 (7.80%) 
State-Building (Caliphate) 260 (12.38%) 43 (11.56%) 
Economics 45 (2.14%) 26 (6.99%) 
Other Jihadist Organizations 149 (7.10%) 17 (4.57%) 
Self-Image 364 (17.33%) 56 (15.05%) 
Modernity 57 (2.71%) 10 (2.69%) 
Total 2100 372 
 
While it may appear as though these numbers and the attached percentages 
would lend themselves well to certain analyses, such as weighing the relative 
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importance of one aspect of the Islamic State’s ideology in comparison to the 
others by way of frequency, this is not the case. 
Note how low a percentage the code/category “Economics” represents of 
the total frequency of segments and elements in Table 3. On the surface, it may 
appear from this quantitative data that economics is of little importance to 
Islamic State ideology. However, as the discussion of its endeavors above 
demonstrates, economics is important to the Islamic State out of all proportion 
of what is otherwise apparent from the quantitative data in Table 3. This reflects 
that “holographic” quality of the Islamic State’s ideology and underscores the 
problem of attempting to apply the metrics of Islamic State ideology to analysis 
in any meaningful way. Such application, therefore, should be pursued with 
great caution.  
The Problem of Modernity 
As noted in Chapter One, there is no scholarly consensus on the orientation of 
Salafist jihadism vis-à-vis modernity, and this extends to Islamism more 
generally. The same is true in the case of the Islamic State, though generally 
scholars falling into the anti-modern camp tend to view the spectacular and 
theatric violence displayed by the Islamic State as being proof-positive of the 
group’s “virulent” anti-modernity.89 On the other side of this debate, scholars 
                                                 
89 For a variety of examples, see Javier Lesaca, "On Social Media, ISIS Uses Modern Cultural 
Images to Spread Anti-Modern Values," The Brookings Institution, 9-24-2015; Wolfgang 
Mühlberger, "Islamic Soul-Searching on Scorched Earth: ISIL Launches a New Brand of 
Islamism, Which Requires a Uniform Coalition to be Defeated," FIIA COMMENT 19 (2016) 
Online; John Allen, "Remarks at the Center for the American Progress by the Special 
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIL," U.S. Departments of State, 7-14-
2015; Nuray Mert, "The Myth of Sykes-Picot and its Shortcomings," Hurriyet Daily News, 6-23-
2014; United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Cultural Assessment of the 
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will point to this same spectacular and theatric violence and contend that the 
Islamic State rather displays the hallmarks of many of the perpetrators of 
modernity’s greatest atrocities.  
While the camp of scholars which views the Islamic State as modern 
certainly makes the salient, if obvious, point that brutal and systematized 
violence on a grand scale is hardly exempted from the range of modern 
phenomena, neither is it a particular feature. Such violence abounds on both 
sides of whatever dividing line of modernity one cares to draw. Approaches 
utilizing a more diverse criteria than violence, such as Daniel Lerner’s 
formulation of modernization theory, views modernity – especially within the 
Middle East – in terms of Westernization.90  
This formulation is shared by the ideology of the Islamic State, to a 
degree. While the Islamic State does view modernity as a byword or euphemism 
for Westernization, it also responds to the concept of modernity with sarcasm. 
From its ideological perspective, the “modern” has little real meaning beyond its 
use as a temporal designation of the contemporary. Aside from this rote 
meaning, the Islamic State uses quoted forms such as “modern” and “modernist” 
to refer to groups and individuals it deems to have been swayed by Western 
“idolatries” into apostasy. In the eyes of the Islamic State, this “modernity” is in 
fact a false modernity, specifically one which has imposed Western-derived 
universalisms – such as secularism, liberalism, nationalism, democracy, and 
                                                                                                                                   
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)," Global Cultural Knowledge Network, 5-30-2016, 
especially 38, 51, 72. 
90 See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New 
York: The Free Press, 1958). 
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communism – upon an Islamic universalism with which it is existentially 
incompatible. Notably, these same Western universalisms are held by scholars 
of modernization theory and economic development such as Lerner and David 
C. McClelland to be essential elements of modernity.91 
While this paradigm of Westernization became scholastically normative 
of modernization during the mid-twentieth century in large part because the 
post-Ottoman order in the Middle East served as a sort of Westernized 
modernization laboratory during the Mandatory System, that process has been 
identified by Samuel P. Huntington as very destabilizing.92 Following the end of 
the Cold War, the troubled process of modernization in the Middle East had 
created sufficient instability that Huntington devised his paradigm of “clash of 
civilizations” wherein he predicted that Western modernity would come into 
violent conflict with Islamic civilization.93 Unsurprisingly, this formulation is 
shared by the Islamic State:  
Indeed, it is Allah who prepared the Earth for the bloodiest battle before 
the Hour, to see His slaves sweat in spilling their blood and that of His 
enemies. All the factors were laid down precisely. The Crusaders and the 
Jews in the Levant, the Rafidah in Iraq and Persia, and the Caliphate in 
the center. It is the clash of encampments – “civilizations” – that many 
saw coming, as it is found in Allah’s signs throughout history and 
current events. And yet the denier claims that all this is the result of mere 
chaos!94 
The Islamic State clearly accepts this general premise in an Islamic context, 
though it also identifies and rejects Western “modernity” as conceptually non-
                                                 
91 Ibid., 43–68; See also, David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: The Free 
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92 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (London: Yale University 
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existent. Be that as it may, and while approaches toward modernity as a 
phenomenon still tend to favor Western forms in their identifications of 
processes, there has been a shift toward a consideration that modernity is not 
necessarily Westernization by definition.95 With this in mind, it is possible to 
view the ideology of the Islamic State as representing a distinctively Islamic 
iteration of modernity.  
Many of the features of modernity are indeed there. The Islamic State 
rejects tradition in the form of considering most of the history of Islamic 
quietism and jurisprudence, especially since the Ottoman period, as being 
accretions of deviant innovation. Note, this should not be confused with the 
Islamic State’s ideological emphasis on early Islamic praxis and especially early 
prophetic figures like Abraham. Rather than undercutting a rejection of tradition, 
these elements represent that aspect of modernity which seeks a return to or 
reliance on first principles. In the context of Western modernity, this would be 
the equivalent of the developments of Natural Religion and, later, Deism among 
Enlightenment figures such as Baruch Spinoza, or before this, the forwarding of 
biblical religion and the rejection of accumulated Catholic tradition by 
Protestant Reformation figures such as Martin Luther. Faith in the inevitability 
of social and technological progress is also present, through the Islamic State's 
ideology on state-building. When considering the primacy of religion as the 
primary mode of identity construction within the Islamic State's ideology, its 
state-building ideology emerges clearly as an Islamic version of the 
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developments of both the nation-state and public education also associated with 
modernity. The emphasis on formal equality typical of modernity is also present, 
as is that particular tendency of modernity to be infatuated with its own sense of 
historical novelty: 
Were the muwahhid to search every book authored by the historians, he 
would not find mention of any state similar to the Islamic State, 
particularly as it exists following its revival under the wing of Amirul-
Mu’minin Abu Bakr (may Allah support him and keep him firm). For 
has any state ever been established in human history in the manner that 
the Islamic State was revived with its expansion into Sham? Contemplate 
– may Allah have mercy upon you – the states that existed throughout 
history, both the Muslim states and the mushrik states. Were any of them 
established by the emigration of poor strangers from the East and the 
West, who then gathered in an alien land of war and pledged allegiance 
to an “unknown” man, in spite of the political, economic, military, 
media, and intelligence war waged by the nations of the world against 
their religion, their state, and their hijrah? And in spite of the fact that 
they did not have any common “nationality,” ethnicity, language, or 
worldly interests, nor did they have any prior acquaintance! This 
phenomenon is something that has never occurred in human history, 
except in the case of the Islamic State! And nothing like it will ever 
occur thereafter except in relation to it; and Allah knows best.96      
Ultimately, all of the phenomena associated with modernity are present within 
the Islamic State’s ideology, albeit in a distinctively Islamic form. This 
development makes perfect sense in its own context, when it is borne in mind 
that the same figure from whom the Islamic State inherited its sectarian ideology 
on pronouncing takfir, Sayyid Qutb, also sought to build a distinctively Islamic 
modernity free of the pollutions he saw as inherent to Western civilization.97 
Clearly, solving the problem of modernity within scholarship on the 
ideology of the Islamic State, and in reevaluating Salafist jihadism overall, is 
going to require an ontology which looks beyond historical Western iterations of 
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modern phenomena and abandons arbitrary binaries based on the use of violence 
alone.  
Final Thoughts 
While the Islamic State is not the momentous and high-profile presence that it 
was during its initial explosion onto the regional and global stages, the group has 
come back from being declared dead before. The group currently has reverted 
back to operating as a jihadi network targeting people important to the structure 
and security of Iraq, as they did prior to the resurgence that led to their 2014 
declaration of a Caliphate.98 It is not unlikely that the Islamic State is biding its 
time with a strategy of low-level harassment while it waits for Coalition troop 
withdrawals to give it the opening it needs to reassert itself – also like it did last 
time. 
Whatever the case may be, the capacity of the Islamic State to begin 
rebuilding its nascent Caliphate in Iraq and Syria may be less relevant than what 
the dissemination of its ideology may portend for the future of Salafist jihadism. 
This study has demonstrated the categorical differences that the ideology of the 
Islamic State exhibits in comparison to that of al-Qaeda. The impact of this 
ideology, which one might tentatively call an “alternative Salafist jihadism,” has 
already swayed many thousands in addition to those who actually traveled to the 
Islamic State during its period of prominence – inspiring lone wolf attacks and 
the formation of new groups swayed by their ideology around the world.  
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The intense sectarianism and Manichean worldview of the Islamic State 
is certain to have an impact on those groups and individuals who embrace its 
ideology in the coming years. While al-Qaeda may be trending ideologically 
toward more direct cooperation with parties and governments it once sought to 
destroy, as noted above, the ideology of the Islamic State represents a hard tack 
in the direction of an even more extreme concept of Muslim unification. Those 
who follow ideologically after the Islamic State are going to be similarly 
intractable – which could lead to the proliferation of unceasing existential 
conflicts across the globe, each its own small war of annihilation. With that 
prospect in mind, this study concludes with the presentation of a message for the 
West from the ideologues of the Islamic State on its own behalf: 
What’s important to understand here is that although some might argue 
that your foreign policies are the extent of what drives our hatred, this 
particular reason for hating you is secondary […] even if you were to 
stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping 
our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason for 
hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you 
were to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, 
we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop fighting you 
then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter into a 
covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you […] The gist of the 
matter is that there is indeed a rhyme to our terrorism, warfare, 
ruthlessness, and brutality. As much as some liberal journalist would like 
you to believe that we do what we do because we’re simply monsters 
with no logic behind our course of action, the fact is that we continue to 
wage – and escalate – a calculated war that the West thought it had 
ended several years ago […] So you can continue to believe that those 
“despicable terrorists” hate you because of your lattes and your 
Timberlands […] or you can accept reality and recognize that we will 
never stop hating you until you embrace Islam […]99 
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Appendix A: Ideological Elements by Code/Category 
The International Order 
364 codes (17.33%); 74 elements (19.89%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. The international order must be destroyed. 
2. The international order will learn what terrorism really is. 
3. The international order is inherently idolatrous (nationalism, democracy, etc.). 
4. The international order has disgraced and humiliated Muslims by ruling over 
them, robbing them of their birthright. 
5. The world is divided into two camps: (true) Muslims and everyone else, 
encompassing the international order. 
6. Jews control the international order. 
7. Muslims must remove themselves from the international order. 
8. The Islamic State is a destructive repudiation of the international order. 
9. The Islamic State is a viable alternative to the international order. 
10. The Islamic State is to be a global state, destroying and replacing the 
international order. 
11. The borders imposed by the international order, such as those derived from 
Sykes-Picot, are un-Islamic and must be destroyed. 
12. The Islamic State embraces a collaborative method superior to the 
hegemony of the international order. 
13. Muslims must, and can only, reject the international order that subjugates 
them. 
14. Muslims are obligated to revolt against the sinful and unjust tyranny of the 
international order. 
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15. Islam is both a political and religious order, inseparable, beyond any claims 
of the international order. 
16. The manmade laws of the international order are idolatry. 
17. A Muslim who submits to the manmade laws of the international order 
commits apostasy. 
18. Ideologies of the international order, such as nationalism, are a poison which 
in the past inhibited the revival of the Caliphate. 
19. Jihad is the only acceptable Islamic response to the international order. 
20. Islamist “parties” operating within the international order are apostate and 
thus fundamentally illegitimate.  
21. The international order must be divested of Muslims through hijra 
(immigration) to the Caliphate. 
22. The international order is to be brought to chaos through jihad. 
23. The Islamic State is a jihadi state that exists outside of the international order 
and cannot be a part of it – it exists in a different world. 
24. The international order must be destroyed so that the Islamic State can 
preserve the Muslim masses against the risk of apostasy. 
25. The individual Muslim in the world beyond the territory of the Islamic State 
can remove him/herself from the international order by swearing allegiance to 
the Caliph and weakening the international order from within itself. 
26. The nation-state as a fixture of the international order is fundamentally 
idolatrous. All such nation-states are to be destroyed. 
74 
27. The international order is based upon the polluted ideology that individuals 
possess the absolute liberty to choose between truth and falsehood. 
28. The story of Noah and the Flood is analogous to the polluted ideology of 
choice that pervades the international order. 
29. The only true choice is between Islam and the Flood (destruction of the 
international order). 
30. The international order has polluted Muslim lands with things that contradict 
Islam: such as Baathism, secularism, liberalism, democracy. 
31. The international order encompasses the lands of hypocrisy, which much be 
abandoned by Muslims for the Islamic State – the land of sincerity. 
32. The laws of the international order have no meaning for Muslims 
33. The laws of the international order claim that it is legitimate for the United 
States to kill any number of Muslims as “collateral damage,” yet labels jihadis 
barbaric and criminal. 
34. The violence of the international order against Muslims must be met with 
violence in like kind. 
35. The advent of the Islamic State is unprecedented in history, heralding the 
destruction of the international order and advent of a new age. 
36. The international order enslaves Muslims through its global economic 
system of labor and wages. 
37. Living within the international order “kills the heart” of Muslims and 
renders them vulnerable to apostasy. 
38. Jihad cannot end until the international order is destroyed. 
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39. The international order is by nature an act of aggressive warfare, a Crusade, 
against Muslims. 
40. The Islamic State will destroy the international order and replace it with a 
fully functional Islamic society. 
41. America is threatening its hegemony over the international order by 
empowering enemies like Russia and Iran in its drive to fight the Islamic State 
because the US doesn’t have the wherewithal to confront the Islamic State 
directly. 
42. Supposed scholars and pseudo-jihadis who try to stand in a middle ground 
between the international order and the Islamic State are in fact servants of the 
international order, there is no “gray zone.” 
43. The international order has no legitimacy to tell Muslims what Islam is. 
44. Each nation-state of the international order that attacks or supports the war 
against the Islamic State has opened itself up to attacks in their own homelands. 
45. The totality of the international order, from economics to journalism and 
media, is at war with Muslims out of hatred for Islam. 
46. The international order is content to kill Muslim women and children in the 
name of its own interests. 
47. The media of the international order routinely ignores Crusader massacres of 
Muslims. 
48. Each region, group, or area that declares itself a part of the Islamic State 
destroys a piece of the international order and becomes part of a new world. 
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49. The Islamic State is a holistic replacement for the international order it will 
destroy, from media to economics, such as its minting of dinars. 
50. The Islamic State has confounded the international order’s attempts to 
destroy it for a dozen years. 
51. The Arab Spring was a false revolution supported by the international order 
to further disrupt Muslim unity and increase apostasy. 
52. The Shia and other apostates must be wiped out before the international 
order can truly be destroyed effectively. 
53. Part of the US hegemony over the international order is its possession of 
much of the world’s gold and the petrodollar system. 
54. The true reason for the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq was the attempt by Saddam 
Hussein to abandon the petrodollar for its oil sales and use petroeuros instead. 
55. The norms of the international order are meaningless, only the norms of 
Islam matter – the two are existentially incompatible. 
56. No peace can exist between the international order and the Islamic State, 
only impermanent conditional truces are possible. 
57. It is as natural for the international order to attempt to destroy the Islamic 
State as it is for the Islamic State to seek the destruction of the international 
order. 
58. The sexual revolution drove the US and the international order into a spiral 
of immorality. 
59. The international order, dominated by Western “Civilization,” considers its 
moral degeneracy and its idolatry to be “values.” 
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60. The post-Arab Spring governments are puppet governments intended to keep 
Muslims subservient to the international order. 
61. The Islamic State is a refuge for Muslims outside the international order, 
where they will not be polluted by the idolatrous ideologies of Crusaders, 
Zionists, and their apostate lapdogs. 
62. The current international order and its idolatrous ideologies cannot be 
“Islamized,” they must be destroyed and replaced with a world order based upon 
the religion of Allah. 
63. The international order’s violence against Muslims has terrorized them into 
believing wild conspiracy theories about the extent and capacities of its power. 
64. The flags of the nation-states imposed upon Muslims by the international 
order were originally designed by Mark Sykes, they are idolatrous and 
illegitimate. 
65. The international order’s laws against slavery are irrelevant, clear provisions 
for the existence and regulation of slavery exist within Islam. 
66. The immediate damage caused by apostate Muslims embracing the 
international order is more dire than that of the international order at large. 
67. Nationalism divides Muslims and enables their subjugation by the 
international order. 
68. The international order has finally managed to coopt al-Qaeda since the 
death of Osama bin Laden, making them allies and supporters of the apostate 
states they once tried to destroy. 
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69. The international order’s division of nationality and race are against the 
unity of Islam. 
70. The international order’s oppression of Muslim lands has driven many 
Muslims out of these lands, weakening them and exposing these Muslims to the 
risk of apostasy. 
71. Ottoman deviance made Muslim lands vulnerable to the West, making it 
possible for the rise of the international order of today. 
72. The apostate post-colonial rulers are proxies of the international order’s 
subjugation of Muslims. 
73. Because of its generally democratic and representative nature, all the citizens 
of the international order are guilty and culpable for its violence against 
Muslims and Islam. 
74. The current international order is the result of the Crusader’s war against 
Islam. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
13 codes (0.62%); 9 elements (2.42%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. Israel will be destroyed. 
2. The Jews there will be subjugated and made to pay the jizya or killed if they 
refuse. 
3. Apostate regimes and groups offer only empty words for the Muslims in 
Palestine. 
4. Hamas’ participation in democratic elections make it an apostate group that 
must be destroyed. 
5. The “jihad” of Hamas is a false jihad. 
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6. The government of the Palestinians is apostasy and must be destroyed. 
7. Palestinian nationalism is apostasy and must be destroyed. 
8. The apostasy of Muslims in Palestine must be eradicated before the battle can 
turn to the Jewish State itself. 
9. It is not an “Arab-Israeli” conflict, it is a Muslim-Jewish conflict. 
 
 
Sectarianism 
287 codes (13.67%); 44 elements (11.83%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. There are only two camps in the world, the Islamic State and the world of 
idolatry. 
2. Anyone claiming to be a Muslim who doesn’t swear allegiance to the Islamic 
State is an apostate. 
3. It is obligatory for the Islamic State to make war on apostates and restore 
Islam among Muslims. 
4. The concept of “free choice” for Muslims between religious and secular 
government is apostasy. 
5. Nationalism, democracy, secularism, liberalism, Marxism, and Baathism are 
idolatry, Muslims who engage in them are apostates. 
6. Manmade law is idolatry, Muslims who make and follow them are apostates. 
7. The Islamic State is like Noah before the Flood, offering the choice between 
Islam and destruction. 
8. The Islam of the Islamic State is the true Islam, with many proofs that 
apostates ignore. 
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9. Tombs and ancient ruins are idolatrous, especially when used to shore up 
nationalism, and must be destroyed. 
10. Hamas’ participation in democratic elections make it an apostate group that 
must be destroyed. 
11. The “jihad” of Hamas is a false jihad. 
12. The government of the Palestinians is apostasy and must be destroyed. 
13. Palestinian nationalism is apostasy and must be destroyed. 
14. The apostasy of Muslims in Palestine must be eradicated before the battle 
can turn to the Jewish State itself. 
15. Religious pluralism is apostasy. 
16. So-called Islamists and jihadis who fight the Islamic State announce their 
apostasy in the act of taking up arms. 
17. Any apostate who repents and swears allegiance to the Islamic State before 
being captured shall be welcomed back into the fold of Islam. Otherwise they 
will be killed. 
18. Barack Obama is an apostate. 
19. The Islamic State’s war with the Kurds in not a nationalistic war, it is a 
religious war against Kurdish apostasy – some of the most gallant jihadis 
fighting Kurdish apostates are Kurds themselves. 
20. The Yazidi were pagans from the pre-Islamic period who remained pagan 
but became “Islamized” over time, they are ineligible for jizya and it is 
permitted to enslave their women.  
21. Any Muslim who allies with Christians or Jews is an apostate. 
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22. There is no “gray zone” between the Islamic state and the Crusaders, 
Muslims who attempt to stay in the such a “gray zone” are apostates. 
23. The Shia are the first priority for attack. 
24. Takfir is necessary and required but is not to be proclaimed without proof of 
apostasy. 
25. The Islamic State is not a khawariji group, regardless of the claims of its 
detractors, and opposes khawarijiism along with all other forms of apostasy. 
26. Al-Qaeda slid into apostasy after the death of Osama bin Laden. 
27. When people say that Islam is “the religion of peace” and mean pacifism, 
that is apostasy. 
28. The apostasy of democracy ascribes Allah’s sole right of legislation to 
mankind. 
29. Islam and nationalism cannot coexist because nationalism and citizenship 
places the nation-state before Islam as the primary unit of identity.  
30. Jihad is only valid if it is done correctly, fighting for the sake of the apostate 
nations of Muslim lands, even against Crusaders, is itself apostasy rather than 
jihad. 
31. Nationalist groups that use “Islamic” language are still apostates. 
32. It is not permissible for Muslims to fight alongside apostates, even against 
other apostates – instead, Muslims should fight both parties. 
33. Islam is the answer to the racism that plagues the lands of the Crusaders. 
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34. Claims that no Islamic power tried to wipe out the Shia fails to account for 
the fact that the Shia were only numerous enough to form their own state 400 
years ago. 
35. A belief in American exceptionalism is apostasy. 
36. Pacifist Salafis are apostates. 
37. The Muslim Brotherhood is a particularly virulent apostate group, including 
its offshoot Hamas. 
38. Christians have only three options: embrace Islam, submit to the jizya and 
Islamic dominance, or continue fighting the Islamic State and face death. 
39. It is good and right for Muslims to hate disbelievers. 
40. The blood of all disbelievers is halal to shed so long as they and Muslims 
exist in a state of war. 
41. The Ottoman state was also an apostate state, one which led the Muslim 
lands to ruin. 
42. All war is religious war, any other reason or slogan is a lie and a deception.  
43. The only thing apostate ideologies, governments, and parties in Muslim 
lands accomplish is to divide Muslims amongst themselves and empower their 
Crusader enemies. 
44. It is forbidden to kill disbelievers with whom the Muslims have a covenant 
(dhimmi status/jizya). 
Violence/Combat 
295 codes (14%); 64 elements (17%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. Within its territory, anyone who resists the authority of the Islamic State is to 
be fought if they persist after their error has been pointed out. 
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2. Those who dispute the legitimacy of the Islamic State must be fought. 
3. Jihad is an obligation for Muslims, especially when Muslim lands have been 
invaded by disbelievers. 
4. Chaos and terror are to be used to prevent any apostate regime from 
maintaining stability in its power. 
5. Jihad will destabilize regions in apostate countries, which can then be 
established as Muslim strongholds. 
6. Appropriate violence is to be used within the Islamic State in dealing with 
laws, such as the stoning of a woman for adultery. 
7. Enemy arms and armor are to be taken as war booty. 
8. Crusader personnel may be taken for ransom and executed if payment is 
refused by the Crusader’s government. 
9. If American “collateral damage” is acceptable, so are terror attacks against 
“civilians.” 
10. Apostates and Crusaders are equally valid targets. 
11. If a tribe engages in action against the Islamic State, that entire tribe is 
rendered apostate – except for those individuals who disavow their tribes. 
12. Combat is the best means to gain wealth.  
13. The death of executed abductees is the fault of the Crusader and apostate 
government who refuse to ransom their own people. 
14. The Islamic State’s jihad is ultimately a defensive one, it was the Crusaders 
who invaded and subjugated Muslim lands. 
15. The fighters of the Islamic State can only be killed, never defeated. 
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16. The jihad against the Crusaders is repayment for their own aggression.  
17. The preferred occupation of Muslims is jihad. 
18. The pagan Yazidis are to be fought, killed, and enslaved unless they turn to 
Islam. 
19. Despite its prowess in battle, the true power of the Islamic State’s fighters 
comes from Islam. 
20. The war made against the Islamic State is the greatest testimony from Allah 
as to the rightness of its cause. 
21. Jews and Christians are not to be allied with in battle. 
22. It is vital that Muslims attack people in each of the countries currently 
engaged in war with the Islamic State, and that these countries know why the 
killing occurred.  
23. Journalists are valid targets because they are agents of the Crusaders and 
apostate regimes.  
24. The urgency of Allah’s commands gives the Muslim fighter the capacity for 
great feats. 
25. The Shia must be destroyed first before the rest of Islam’s enemies can be 
fully dealt with. 
26. Apostate Palestinians must be destroyed before Israel can be effectively 
fought and destroyed. 
27. Apostates cannot be allies, they must be fought. 
28. Guard duty is vital and must not be neglected. 
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29. Physical and martial training are obligatory upon Muslims for the purposes 
of jihad. 
30. Any state attacking the Islamic State or aiding those who do will result in the 
Islamic State raising the priority of attacks on that state and its people. 
31. Violence will be returned upon Crusaders and apostates in the same manner 
it was inflicted upon Muslims. 
32. Retaliatory burning by fire is justified through five distinctive and explicit 
proofs. 
33. Moral and correct Islamic conduct is required of all soldiers of the Islamic 
State. 
34. Blood must not be spilled unjustly. 
35. The art of warfare is to be studied closely and applied to operations. 
36. Maintain discipline, but do not oppress the men under your command. 
37. Islam is the religion of the sword, not the religion of pacifism. 
38. Warfare cannot end until the religion of the world is for Allah alone. 
39. Temporary truces with enemies are permissible, but not permanent peace 
treaties. 
40. Only war in the cause of Islam is legitimate. 
41. The children of the Islamic State will be better soldiers than their fathers 
because they were born and raised in war. 
42. The destruction of ancient and contemporary iconography is an essential part 
of jihad. 
43. Slaves are to be treated fairly. 
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44. Though enslaved, Yazidi women and other enslaved pagans must not be 
forcibly converted to Islam. 
45. The call to jihad overrides all other considerations, including the disapproval 
of one’s parents, should they do so. 
46. The Islamic State’s war against opium production will continue. 
47. The only complete solution to America’s war with Islam is either to accept 
Islam or pay the jizya.  
48. The violence by and inspired by the Islamic State will teach the Crusaders 
the true meaning of terrorism. 
49. “Islamic scholars” who legitimize apostate regimes against the Islamic State 
are valid targets, as they are apostates themselves. 
50. The death of a single Muslim is graver than the massacre of every idolater in 
the world. 
51. Those who survive the Islamic State’s violence are intended to be physically 
and mentally maimed as a message to its enemies. 
52. Any apostate who repents before capture will be given amnesty, even if he 
killed a million Muslims during his apostasy. If he is captured before 
repentance, however, a painful death awaits him. 
53. The soldiers of the Islamic State are righteously bloodthirsty and fight a war 
of just terror against the Crusaders and apostates. 
54. The violence of the Islamic State is far from senseless. It proceeds from a set 
of very specific Islamic rules. 
87 
55. Takfir and attack are only permissible if the apostasy of the individual or 
group is certain. 
56. What the West refers to as “lone-wolf” attacks are in fact designated “just 
terror operations.” 
57. The Crusaders and apostates were mistaken in thinking that driving the 
Islamic State from Dabiq would break its resolve to fight. 
58. Supplication and appeal to Allah is as important a weapon of jihad as tanks 
and machine guns. 
59. The valor of Islamic State soldiers is unrivaled. 
60. Islamic State violence is to be focused also upon smuggling and others who 
prey on Muslims in the chaos of war. 
61. Soldiering for the Islamic States requires both valor and patience, as the 
venture is as much about building a state for Islam as it is destroying its 
enemies.  
62. People of the Book who refuse to submit to the jizya must be destroyed 
along with their houses of worship. 
63. People of the Book who separate themselves clearly away from others who 
fight the Islamic State, especially cowering in Churches, are not to be attacked. 
Leave them to cower while the Islamic State kills the others, then subject them 
to jizya – they may retain their Churches. 
64. The Islamic State will destroy the enemies of Islam or else die in the 
attempt. 
Islamic Governance 
266 codes (12.67%); 29 elements (7.80%). Ideological elements listed below: 
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1. There is no conflict between technical knowledge and Islamic governance. 
2. Islamic governance is to be a global religious governance. 
3. The collecting of zakah funds for the maintenance of public services is vital. 
4. Islam and politics have always been inseparable. 
5. Islamic leadership is both a political and religious vocation. 
6. The Quran itself is a book of governance, legislation, and enforcement, which 
secularism has made people forget. 
7. It is obligatory to institute Islamic governance in any territory under the 
control of Muslims. 
8. A leader is only to be obeyed if his orders do not conflict with Islam, 
otherwise he is to be obeyed utterly. 
9. Islamic governance and the Caliphate require each other. 
10. Nationalism is an apostasy antithetical to Islamic governance. 
11. A jihadi state is the ideal environment for the establishment of Islamic 
governance. 
12. Islamic governance must address contemporary concerns as well as matters 
of the faith, such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money 
counterfeiting.  
13. The establishment of Islamic governance is an imperative, it cannot wait for 
some foggy future. 
14. Islam is a holistic way of life which cannot be approached piecemeal. To 
deny the necessity of Islamic governance is to deny Islam. 
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15. Islamic governance must both fight its enemies and provide for its people to 
the best of its ability. 
16. Proper Islamic governance requires careful consideration in its rulings on 
matters of apostasy and the status of different groups. 
17. The Yazidi have been ruled a pagan group despite their worship of Iblis. 
Rather than an apostate creed, the Yazidi religion is a pagan religion that was 
Islamized through proximity to Muslim cultures across history which failed in 
their duty to properly deal with them. 
18. Islamic governance must deal gently with Muslims and let them feel the 
sweetness and honor of Islam and must beware of making Muslims fear Islam 
and its rulings – and must help the people accept its more bitter aspects. 
19. Islamic governance requires active engagement by Muslims through the 
avenues of discussion between the people and power. 
20. Islamic governance must not isolate itself from the realities of the lives of 
the masses. 
21. Leaders in Islamic governance must hold themselves and others responsible 
for executing justice in the name of Allah in their endeavors. 
22. Partisanship is dangerous to effective Islamic governance and must be 
avoided. 
23. Democracy is fundamentally incompatible with Islamic governance because 
democracy is an apostasy which ascribes to man the same authority of 
legislation to men which belongs to Allah alone. 
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24. Islamic governance and nationalism cannot coexist: there is no such thing as 
an Iraqi or a Palestinian or a Syrian: there are Muslims and disbelievers, that is 
all. 
25. Proper Islamic governance makes provision for both religious and technical 
education. 
26. Islamic governance through the Prophetic Methodology (emulation of 
Muhammad’s actions and rulership) is the proper way. 
27. “Machiavellianism” is apostasy, the ends do not justify the means – forgoing 
any of Allah’s law in governance makes that government un-Islamic. 
28. Proper Islamic governance prevents the kind of racial unrest and violence 
currently being seen in America. 
29. For a Muslim who would support Islamic governance, the only path is hijra 
to one of the Islamic State’s territories. 
State-Building (Caliphate) 
260 codes (12.38%); 43 elements (11.56%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. The Islamic State is an immigrant state meant for all Muslims, be they 
Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Iraqi, Yemeni, German, etc. 
2. The state must be built upon the talent of doctors, engineers, scholars, and 
specialists as well as upon jihad. 
3. Administration arms like the Public Relations and Tribal Affairs are essential 
elements of building the Islamic State. 
4. Providing public works and services, as well as implementing religious 
enforcement, are integral to the building of the Islamic State. 
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5. The Islamic State must bring security to the areas under its control to foster 
the return of economic growth and the establishment of public services. 
6. Enduring the hardship of building the Islamic State is obligatory for Muslims 
and especially those on the path of jihad. 
7. Building the Islamic State has always been the goal of true jihadis since the 
revival of jihad this century. 
8. The Islamic State is unique to this age for being entirely founded by jihadis. It 
is a jihadi state; its very existence is an essential act of jihad. 
9. The Islamic State increases security by stamping out drug trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, and money counterfeiting. 
10. The Islamic State must see also to the medical care of the Muslims in its 
territory. 
11. The Islamic State’s state-building and its renewal of the Caliphate is 
fulfilling one of the fundamental elements of Islam. 
12. The Islamic State is built as a refuge and a fortress for Muslims who have 
been oppressed by the world made by the Crusaders. 
13. The state being built is a new Islamic giant – the opponent and ultimate 
destroyer of Western civilization. 
14. The institution of slavery is an integral element of state-building in the 
Islamic model that has been revived after its unlawful abandonment. 
15. The dissolution of international borders is integral to the building of the 
Islamic State, which repudiates the nation-states of Sykes-Picot and will see 
them destroyed. 
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16. The Islamic State must build the appropriate bureaucracy needed to 
administer its growing state, such as the General Services Committee, which 
focuses on infrastructure with projects aimed at restoring electricity, and 
building irrigation networks for agriculture, as well as cleaning and repairing 
the state’s roads and highways. 
17. Administrative offices are also necessary to ensure the maintenance of 
justice and matters such as caring for orphans and the needy. 
18. Building an Islamic economy is an integral part of building the revived 
Caliphate. To that end, the Islamic State has taken steps to begin minting its 
own gold dinars. 
19. The Islamic State builds its state by bringing unity to the Muslims, 
dissolving all previous group distinctions and parties. 
20. The increasing of lands under control of the Islamic State is as important to 
building the state as it is to the freedom of Muslims under the Crusader and 
apostate yoke. 
21. The state of the Muslims is an egalitarian state where “the blood of every 
Muslim is equal” before Allah. 
22. The Islamic State, in its infancy, is weak and vulnerable relative to the 
power of its enemies. However, the Muslims must persist in the building. 
23. To build its state, the Muslims must be as sweet and gentle with its own 
people as it is vicious and unyielding with its enemies. 
24. For the proper building of the Islamic State, guard duty is as important as 
front-line fighting. 
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25. The Islamic State seeks the consultation of its people, the appropriate 
channels to do so are to be maintained. 
26. The officials of the Islamic State cannot merely see to their own security. 
Building a state requires that its officials take up seeing to the needs of the 
people. 
27. The Islamic State cannot be built if it sheds innocent blood, for Allah will 
withhold His blessing from the state if it builds itself in such a way. 
28. The Islamic State must spurn tyranny as it builds its state. 
29. Expanding the Islamic State by incorporating new provinces must be done 
according to a deliberate process. 
30. The “Far Enemy” cannot be defeated first, or at all, without the 
establishment of a state for all Muslims. This is the Islamic State. 
31. The Islamic State will build its state with all sincere Muslims who seek to 
join it, even one who previously fought it – even if he killed a million Muslims 
– if he repents he will be welcomed into the state as a brother. 
32. Nationalism is antithetical to building a state for Muslims. 
33. The young are essential to the building of the Islamic State as a generation 
of children raised in a true state of Muslims will become the spectacular flower 
of Islam. 
34. The immigration of Muslim women to the Islamic State is as important for 
the building of the state as the immigration of men. 
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35. The Islamic State is a true Muslim state built upon Islam, not like the 
apostate states, which were built upon Western ideologies and through 
Crusader machinations. 
36. Building the Islamic State requires the development and maintenance of the 
full range of cutting edge medical services including its clinics, hospitals, and 
the opening of medical colleges in Raqqa and Mosul open to both males and 
females. 
37. The state-building of the Islamic State is required to include all the elements 
of a complete Muslim society. 
38. The lie of the “Arab Spring” has swelled the Islamic State, bringing those 
Muslims who finally understand the falsehood of the apostate regimes and the 
clear hand of Crusader machinations.  
39. Order and sustainability are vital to the building of a state of Muslims, hence 
the issuance of ID cards and measures such as fishing quotas. 
40. The Islamic State will not build itself on the growing and selling of opium. 
41. The successful building of a state requires vigilance against abuses, thus the 
Islamic State has established and maintains the Central Office for Investigating 
Grievances as well as several other bodies for eliminating injustice and rooting 
out corruption within the state. 
42. The motherhood of Muslim women is a necessity for building the Islamic 
State. 
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43. There are no borders in building the Islamic State, its provinces spring up 
wherever the Muslims cast off the world made by the Crusaders and seize the 
place as their own and for Islam. 
 
 
 
Economics 
45 codes (2.14%); 26 elements (6.99%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. The global economy is designed as a weapon to ruin Muslims, this economic 
warfare sets apostate leaders against the interest of their people, who are stolen 
from. 
2. The Islamic State will bring down the corrupt global economy, developing an 
Islamic economy in its place. 
3. The Crusader imposed borders of Sykes-Picot is part of the economic warfare 
designed to restrict and impoverish Muslims, destroying those borders will 
facilitate free trade among Muslims. 
4. The global economy oppresses Muslims under wage slavery to non-Muslim 
masters. 
5. The Islamic State fights for economic as well as political liberation from the 
Crusader dominated international order and global economy. 
6. The Islamic State will wage its own economic counter-offensive against the 
Crusader global economy. 
7. The global economy will be, over time, taken from the apostates and 
Crusaders as war booty and redistributed to Muslims. 
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8. The global economy is an inherently corrupt, interest-based system. 
9. The economic wealth of the Crusaders is spent lavishly in attacking Muslims. 
10. Muslims must exit the Crusader global economy. The gold dinar is integral 
to this process. 
11. The global economy will be ruined by the worldwide collapse of the dollar. 
12. The free-market mechanisms of gold value represent true value, rather than 
the contrivances of monetary policy. 
13. The petrodollar system is a tool for American imperialism. 
14. Economic sanctions are economic warfare that constitutes the murder of 
Muslims who die in poverty. 
15. Iraq’s move to adopt the petroeuro was the true cause of the 2003 American 
invasion. 
16.  The Islamic State’s seizure of apostate oil production and the sale of its own 
cheap oil is intended to attack the global economy by destabilizing the 
petrodollar system – ultimately destroying the petrodollar system by forcing 
the rest of world to pay for Muslim oil in actual gold. 
17. Fiat currencies are a tool of Crusader dominance and oppression of Muslims. 
18. The Islamic economy created by the Islamic State will be a gold-based 
economy. 
19. Saudi economic addiction to the petrodollar system has led them into 
apostasy and the betrayal of Muslims. 
20. The Afghan drug trade is part of the global economy’s perversion of Muslim 
wealth. 
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21. The Islamic State seeks the immigration of technically skilled Muslims to 
aid in the construction of a complete Islamic economy. 
22. The money seized as war booty is to be redistributed to fund state services. 
23. Religious taxes as redistribution of wealth are vital to establishing an Islamic 
economy, as well as the restoration of personal property rights for Muslims. 
24. An Islamic economy is a war booty dominated economy. 
25. The Islamic State must create a secure environment for economic growth. 
26. An Islamic economy must make fighting poverty a priority in its drive to 
build a welfare state for the Muslims and liberating them from the wage 
slavery of the Crusader global economy. 
Other Jihadist Organizations 
149 codes (7.10%); 17 elements (4.57%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. Other jihadist organizations have been corrupted by the apostasy of 
nationalism. 
2. Other jihadist organizations have abandoned the obligation to establish a 
Caliphate and institute sharia in their territory. 
3. Other jihadist organizations warring with the Islamic State are not jihadist at 
all, they are apostate groups that must be destroyed. 
4. Any jihadist organization that does not swear allegiance to the Caliphate, now 
that it is established, is an apostate group that must be fought and destroyed 
like the others. 
5. Al-Qaeda has slid into apostasy since the death of Osama bin Laden and must 
now be fought like the others. 
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6. So-called jihadists decry the Islamic State in bizarre competition with the 
apostate regimes. 
7. Other jihadists groups are more concerned with strutting before the global 
media than they are committed to fighting for Islam, such is their apostasy. 
8. The jihadis of Algeria have been amongst the most faithful and persistent in 
all the Muslim lands, and the Islamic State is thrilled to have brought many of 
them within their ranks. Though regrettably, many jihadi groups in Algeria too 
have been tainted by the apostasy of nationalism. 
9. Jihadi organizations in the past have been far too liberal with who they will 
ally themselves with, thus has apostasy crept through their ranks and ruined 
their organizations. 
10. A jihadist organization that refuses to make takfir against those who clearly 
deserve it, giving “benefit of the doubt” where there is none, is itself an 
apostate organization. 
11. The jihadis of an organization must abandon it when it becomes clear that its 
leadership has apostatized, lest the jihadis apostatize along with them. 
12. Al-Qaeda’s statements about how it would participate within a democratic 
system are a clear indicator of their apostasy. 
13. The “jihadi” claimants squander their power and the territory under their 
control, refusing to implement the sharia and fighting the Islamic State. 
14. Al-Qaeda’s latter-day alliance with apostate regimes and support of the 
Crusader coalition against the Islamic State is indisputable proof of their 
apostasy. 
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15. Following the apostasy of al-Qaeda, only the Islamic State can lead the 
Muslims. 
16. Hamas is not a real jihadist group. They are an apostate nationalist militia 
and must be destroyed. 
17. Other so-called jihadists will readily ally themselves with the Shia and are 
thus apostates. 
Self-Image 
364 codes (17.33%); 56 elements (15.05%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. The Islamic State has emerged, by the grace of Allah, to end the age of 
darkness that has afflicted Muslims and create a new dawn of Islamic power. 
2. The Islamic State is the only legitimate leader of the Muslims, all Muslims 
who refuse to join, or who fight them, are apostates. 
3. The Islamic State is an entity at the cutting edge of technology, with all the 
technical accoutrements of “modernity” without the stain of apostasy. 
4. The Islamic State is a poly-ethnic, polyglot, immigrant state built by and for 
Muslims, unique in history. 
5. The Islamic State is the only entity that can provide the religious lifestyle and 
education that Muslims thirst for in their hearts. 
6. The Islamic State is a state of Muslims based up the Prophetic Methodology – 
any such state cannot abide the persistence of wrongdoers.  
7. The Islamic State is an egalitarian state under the eyes of Allah who made all 
Muslims equal in blood – its leaders must and will be held to the same 
standards as the rest of the Muslim community. 
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8. The Islamic State combines political and religious leadership as is only proper 
for the community of Muslims. 
9. The Islamic State is the entity that most emulates the religion of Abraham in 
its leadership of Muslims. 
10. The Islamic State is subordinate to Allah, even it cannot order Muslims to 
disobey the law, nor would it. 
11. The Islamic State is the culmination of the goal of all true jihadis since the 
revival of jihad this century. 
12. The Islamic State exists to create terror and chaos within the lands of 
apostasy and idolatry, creating a new world out of that chaos. 
13. The Islamic State’s revival of the Caliphate as an institution provides a clear 
place for Muslims to gather and focus their efforts. 
14. The Islamic State opens its arms to all repentant Muslims and welcomes 
them into the new world of the revived Caliphate. 
15. The Islamic State is the land of Muslims who are the best people on earth, 
living in true Islam and waging just war against the Crusaders and apostates. 
16. The Islamic State is like Noah before the Flood, offering the choice between 
Islam and destruction. 
17. The Islamic State itself becomes like the Flood, washing over and destroying 
apostasy and idolatry in the lands of the Muslims and then beyond to 
ultimately cleanse the entire world. 
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18. The Islamic State is in a position similar to that faced by the Prophet 
Muhammad during his own lifetime – the world is shrouded in the darkness of 
idolatry. 
19. The Islamic State cleaves to true Islam because it is the law of Allah and the 
only true proof against idolatry and the Crusaders who would see the Muslims 
destroyed. 
20. The Islamic State conducts itself according to stringent Islamic law, it is not 
the mad entity bent on senseless violence that the Crusader and apostate media 
depicts it as. 
21. The Islamic State is a stranger in this world in same way that the first 
Muslims were strangers to their districts, tribes, families, and clans during the 
time when Islam was first transmitted to the Prophet Muhammad. 
22. The Islamic State is the site of true Islam, Muslims who immigrate there 
have their prior sins wiped clean through their act of hijra. 
23. The Islamic State is a refuge for Muslims outside the international order, 
where they will not be polluted by the idolatrous ideologies of Crusaders, 
Zionists, and their apostate lapdogs. 
24. The Islamic State is a jihadi state that exists outside of the international order 
and cannot be a part of it – it exists in a different world. 
25. The Islamic State is a holistic replacement for the international order it will 
destroy, from media to economics, such as its minting of dinars. 
26. The Islamic State is not a khawariji group, regardless of the claims of its 
detractors, and opposes khawarijiism along with all other forms of apostasy. 
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27. The Islamic State is unique to this age for being entirely founded by jihadis. 
It is a jihadi state; its very existence is an essential act of jihad. 
28. The Islamic State is a true Muslim state built upon Islam, not like the 
apostate states, which were built upon Western ideologies and through 
Crusader machinations. 
29. The Islamic State is a work in progress, pursued in sincerity by Muslims. Its 
people must be patient with the hardships of building a new state and assist it 
with their efforts and consultations. 
30. The Islamic State is the reality of George W. Bush’s prediction that the 
Muslim lands were changing in such a way that will bring about the 
destruction of Western Civilization. 
31. The Islamic State did not initiate the war it is currently fighting, it was 
started by the Crusaders and their apostate slaves who have oppressed and 
killed many Muslims since the fall of the Ottomans. 
32. The Islamic State has come to understand that a state cannot be established 
and maintained without ensuring that a portion of its soldiers look after both 
the religious and worldly affairs of the Muslims, so it will fight the enemies of 
Islam and build the state of the Muslims with equal vigor and dedication. 
33. The Islamic State is legitimated by the fact that the Crusaders and apostates 
unite against it. 
34. The Islamic State is the inspiration for the violence of Muslims worldwide 
against the Crusaders and apostates. 
35. The Islamic State is a state of Truth, it cannot coexist with Falsehood. 
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36. The Islamic State is a land without borders, its provinces spring up wherever 
the Muslims cast off the world made by the Crusaders and seize the place as 
their own and for Islam. 
37. The Islamic State is required to pronounce takfir against the rising tide of 
apostasy, but it must only do so with certainty. 
38. The Islamic State is required to keep all of its covenants, both to the 
Muslims and those disbelievers who pay the jizya. 
39. The Islamic State fears the attack of the enemy, but it fears Allah more. 
40. The Islamic State is compelled to deal with the Muslims in its territories 
gently, so that they will feel the sweetness and honor of Islam and accept even 
its more bitter aspects. 
41. The Islamic State is a bulwark against the menace of the apostate Shia of 
Iran. 
42. The Islamic State is the true inheritor of the martyred sheik Osama bin 
Laden – al-Qaeda has fallen into apostasy since his death. 
43. Following the apostasy of al-Qaeda, only the Islamic State can lead the 
Muslims. 
44. The Islamic State is the only entity implementing the sharia untainted by 
Western idolatries. 
45. The Islamic State is a concrete and tangible entity to satisfy each Muslim’s 
natural desire for belonging to something greater, bringing life back to the zeal 
latent in the Muslim’s heart. 
104 
46. The Islamic State takes lessons from the failures of the disbelieving nations 
that came before it, it does not dig up and veneration their relics as the apostate 
regimes do. 
47. While the Islamic State does employ terror in its just attacks against the 
Crusaders and apostates, it is so much more than merely a “terrorist 
organization.” Rather, it is a jihadi state for the Muslims that prepares the way 
for and awaits the Hour (End of Days). 
48. The Islamic State is the reviver of the Islamic way of life, even if its ways 
enrage the Crusaders and apostates – their sensibilities are irrelevant to those in 
submission to Allah. 
49. The Islamic State is accused of being “savage,” yet it offers kindness even to 
its slaves, as Allah commands. 
50. The Islamic State is the only place where women can enjoy the full scope of 
Muslim womanhood. 
51. The Islamic State is not a revival of the Ottoman Caliphate. While the 
Islamic State does seek to revive the Muslim world that was subjugated and 
destroyed with its fall, the Ottoman Caliphate itself had fallen into apostasy 
and thus led the Muslims to ruin. 
52. The Islamic State is infinitely more steadfast than the Crusaders and 
apostates imagine, it will not abandon its faith and goals simply because they 
have managed to temporarily reverse some of the Caliphate’s territorial gains – 
even if is driven from Dabiq. There are clear signs of the Hour that must pass 
before the great battle there is to take place. 
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53. The Islamic State does not fight a single enemy who is free of idolatry – no 
one free of idolatry is an enemy of the Islamic State. 
54. The Islamic State is resolved to only two outcomes for its venture: victory or 
the garden of eternity. 
55. The Islamic State is not what it is by virtue of however many bars of gold it 
has, or how many soldiers it fields or planes fill its skies – it is what it is by 
virtue of its implementation of the sharia and its fight against the Crusaders 
and the apostates. 
56. If the Islamic State and its soldiers do not undertake the obligation of 
fighting for the cause of Allah and rescuing the weak among the believers from 
the claws of idolaters, then who would? 
Modernity 
57 codes (2.71%); 10 elements (2.69%). Ideological elements listed below: 
1. The term “modernity” is often a euphemism or byword for Westernization. 
2. Secularism, liberalism, nationalism, democracy, and communism – these are 
not “modern” things, they are Western idolatries.  
3. The language of “modernity” is used to deceive Muslims and lead them away 
from jihad and into Westernized apostasy. 
4. The Islamic State is a unique advent in history. Nothing like it has come 
before and nothing like it will come after, excepting by relation. 
5. “Modern-day” lands and “modern-day” cities of individualism are merely 
centers of Westernized idolatry. 
6. The modern is merely a measure of time, that which is contemporary. 
106 
7. The “modernist” is simply one who values Crusader idolatries more than 
Islam. 
8. The decline and ultimate destruction of Ottoman power was its corruption by 
Western idolatries.  
9. Race is a construct of “modernity” which has no place within Islam. 
10. “Modernity” has no monopoly on the achievements of the human mind, in 
the realms of science and technology, or any other realm. The nature of the 
human mind and its capacities are the gift of Allah. 
